Competition policy
Although there had been legislation about competition in elizabethan England, modern competition policy had its origin in United States Antitrust legislation of the late nineteenth century . Its principal objective is nowadays the pursuit of economic efficiency, although the early antitrust legislators may have had wider political objectives in mind. Its introduction outside the United States began in Europe after the second world war, and it has since spread to most developed countries. Its early development was generally influenced by early antitrust practice, but subsequent intellectual and legal developments have brought about significant modifications.
Uncertainties about the likely impact of competition policy upon the practice of business arise mainly from the fact that its operation requires the exercise of a considerable degree of expert judgement. Its legislative framework provides no more than a broad indication of the intentions of the policymakers who devised it, and it delegates to the authorities which it appoints, a wide range of discretion in their performance of the task of giving practical effect to those intentions. Also, its rationale is in some respects incomplete, leaving scope for a range of interpretations.
Rationale
The main purpose of competition policy is to improve economic efficiency, although some scholars have claimed that the founders of United States antitrust law were mainly motivated by a wish to limit the power of big business [1]
Thus competition theory provides the intellectual foundation for competition policy but it does not provide all that is needed to build a serviceable structure upon that foundation. It does not lead to unequivocal prescriptions except where competition is the only question at issue - and even then the questions of externalities and of ‘the second-best’ may introduce qualifications. Where the issue of gains in productive efficiency also arises, other branches of economic theory must be called in aid. The difficulties which then arise stem not so much from the limitations of the available theory, as from the fact that quantification is then needed in order to draw up a balance between losses of allocative efficiency and gains of productive efficiency. The information requirements for that purpose tend to be demanding, and commercial accounting systems are seldom capable of providing the necessary inputs. In practical terms, therefore, the economic rationale for competition policy is incomplete and, at best, its implementation depends partly upon judgement rather than entirely upon analysis.