Paris Peace Talks

The Paris Peace Talks, which included secret bilateral preparatory talks, formal meetings, walkouts from negotiations, and return to the table after military force, resulted in a formal document signing on January 28, 1973. They signaled an end to U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War, making the Republic of Vietnam responsible for South Vietnam's ground war, 1972-1975. The latter ended with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.

Preliminaries

In April, Nixon had sent communications to Moscow, via Cyrus Vance, to get the Soviets to open communications between the U.S. and North Vietnamese. At talks in May, the North Vietnamese replied to what Kissinger considered the message sent via Vance, with a "Ten Point" program that essentially would have met all North Vietnamese requirements, as a precondition to ending thew war. On August 4, 1969, Henry Kissinger, U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs had a first, secret meeting in Paris with Xuan Thuy, a North Vietnamese diplomat. They met in the apartment of Jean Sainteny, formerly the French Commissioner to Tonkin, who, nearly fifty years before, had tried to find a peaceful way to avoid the Indochinese revolution. Sainteny had sent a letter from Richard M. Nixon, in July, to Ho Chi Minh, suggesting negotiations. Ho and Sainteny were old adversaries who respected one another.

The Nixon letter, however, did threaten "measures of great consequence and force" if there were no diplomatic progress by November 1. Ho was dying, and may not actually have written the reply, which Nixon called a "cold rebuff."

Among the preconditions for discussion, set by the real head of the North Vietnamese delegation, Le Duc Tho, assisted by Nguyen Co Thach, were total U.S. withdrawal, removal of the South Vietnamese government and replacement by a NLF-based coalition with approval over other members.

In the preliminary discussions of the Paris Peace Talks, Le Duc Tho had originally demanded demanded the "Thieu-Ky-Huong" group be replaced as part of non-negotiable preconditions for negotiations. Once Khiem replaced Huong, the North Vietnamese demand changed to removal of "Thiu-Ky-Khiem".

Counteroffer

Johnson agreed to stop bombing North Vietnam proper, although he would continue reconnaissance over the North and bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail, and, of course, in South Vietnam. According to Kissinger, there also was an "understanding", never formally confirmed by the North but to which it did not object, that there would be:

• No attacks on major cities
• No artillery fire from or across the Demilitarized Zone
• No threatening troop movements in or near the DMZ, which would suggest movement into the South

The first meeting was on 10 May, with the delegations headed by Xuan Thuy, North Vietnamese foreign minister, and ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman. The main discussions were outside the conference room, where there continued to be symbolic arguments about status, and even of the shape of the table, by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, Viet Cong).

Without the participation of the RVN, it was difficult to conceive of serious negotations, unless one accepted the North Vietnamese claim that the RVN was a total puppet of the U.S. Given the constant friction between the RVN and U.S., this seemed less than plausible. The North's additional demand to include the NLF as an equal party also delegitimized the RVN, something utterly unacceptable to Thieu.

Two days after the start, the Communist position was that substantive talks could begin only with the total and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces, coupled with an overthrow of the RVN. In practice, this led to continued four-way posturing that accomplished little, while secret talks continued between the US and DRV.