Napoleon

Napoleon (Napoleon Bonaparte or, after 1804, Napoleon I, Emperor of the French) was a world historic figure and dictator of France from 1799 to 1814, He was the greatest general of his age--perhaps any age, with a sure command of battlefield tactics and campaign strategies, As a civil leader he played a major role in French history, becoming Emperor of France in 1804 He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems. He fought an unending series of wars against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies and abdicated in 1814. In 1815 he returned from exile, took control of France, built a new army, and in 100 days almost succeeded--but was defeated at Waterloo and exiled to a remote island. His image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

Italy and Corsica in 1799

Origins

Born Napoleone Buonaparte at Ajaccio, Corsica, on Aug. 15, 1769, he was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer with some claim to noble rank, and Letizia Ramolino. Genoa had just sold Corsica to France. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under Pasquale Paoli; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French--he always had a thick Corsican accent--Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, a pauper even among the aristocratic poor, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.

There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence. During his 10 years as a junior officer made 5 extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.

Rise to Power

Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under Robespierre to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.

The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived Republic: no more representative government, assemblies, a collegial executive, or liberty.

Napoleon Crossing the Alps in 1800, by Jacque-Louis David (1801)

Military Operations to 1812

The treaty of Tilsit in 1807 ended the War of the Third Coalition--in which Russia, Prussia, and Austria defeated in turn and Napoleon gained control of most of the continent.

The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.

The Polish issue

In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812. Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class buraucracies.

Moscow

Collapse, 1813-1814

The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.

Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in 1813. His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.

Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813 in a failed effort to capture Berlin, Prussia's capital. He won at Dresden but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.

Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the Battle of Leipzig, called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies. It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides. Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms. In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France. The French army, now controlled by Louis XVIII numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.

Europe in 1815 just before Waterloo

100 Days to Waterloo, 1815

In March 1815, Napoleon secretly landed in France and rallied his supporters. They flocked to his cause as the French royal officials lost control; Napoleon entered Paris in triumph and raised new armies.

The Allies, meeting at a peace conference in Vienna, sent a million soldiers to stop him. The largest contingents was a multinational force under the command of the Briton, the Duke of Wellington. Napoleon defeated the German army under Blücher at Ligny but had to turn and stop Wellington before he merged forces with Blücher. At a very hard and closely fought battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815, Blücher arrived at the last moment and Napoleon was finally and totally defeated. He surrendered to the British who sent him in exile to the remote island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic, where he died a prisoner in 1821. His relatives lost their royal positions; his imperial army, and particularly the legendary Imperial Guard, were disbanded, and Europe entered an era of peace.

Impact on France

Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancien régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.

Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon';s supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris. The Catholic system was reestablished by the the Concordat of 1801 (signed with Pope Pius VII), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestant and atheists were tolerated.

The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiles aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible. He kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerists and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.

Impact on Europe

Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.

The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and America, application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the Catholic Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.

Napoleon lifted all restriction on Jews in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.

After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep Poland within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.

Personality

All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence. Chandler starts with his hypnotic personality; although not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation.

After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general.

In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars. Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers, for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personalities neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.

Propaganda and memory

Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.

The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class buraucracies.

Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood when considered within its socio-political context. It played a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. Widespread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena and Napoleon as an inspiration for patriotism, individual and collective liberties, and political mobilization manifested themselves in seditious materials, notably displaying the tricolor and rosettes, and subversive activities celebrating anniversaries of Napoleon's life and reign and disrupting royal celebrations, and demonstrated the prevailing and successful goal of the varied supporters of Napoleon to constantly destabilize the Bourbon regime.

Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on two plays and two novels from the period - Victorien Sardou's Madame Sans-Gêne (1893), Maurice Barrès's Les Déracinés (1897), Edmond Rostand's L'Aiglon (1900), and Gyp's Napoléonette (1913) Datta examines how writers and critics of the Belle Epoque exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.

Bibliography

Biographies

• Asprey, Robert. The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. (2002); 2 vol, 1200pp well-written popular biography focusing on the military
• Barnett, Corelli. Bonaparte (1978), hostile
• Emsley, Clive. Napoleon 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
• Cronin, Vincent. Napoleon (1971), favorable popular bio
• Ellis, Geoffry. Napoleon (1997)
• Englund, Steven. Napoleon: A Political Life. (2004). 575 pages; the best (and most advanced) political biography; thin on military
• Fisher, Herbert. Napoleon (1913) 256pp old classic online edition
• Fournier, August. Napoleon the First: A Biography (1903); 836 pages; excellent old biography online edition
• Herold, J. Christopher. The Age of Napoleon (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
• Johnson, Paul. Napoleon: A Penguin Life. (2002). 208 pp.
• Lefebvre, Georges: Napoleon, 1969, French perspective
• Markham, Felix. Napoleon 1963. 304pp online edition
• McLynn, Frank. Napoleon: A Biography (2003) 752pp, stress on military
• Rose, John Holland. The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records, (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; online editon vol 1 online editon vol 2
• Schom, Alan. Napoleon Bonaparte: A Life (1997), 944pp; very hostile; argues Napoleon was a paranoiac psychopath
• Thompson, J. M. Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain
• Tulard, Jean. Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour (1985)
• Woloch, Isser. Napoleon and His Collaborators: the making of a dictatorship (2001)

General reference

• Chandler, David. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars (1993)
• Esposito, Vincent J. and John R. Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (1999); textbook; includes the West Point maps
• Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. ed. The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
• Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective; stress on history of ideas
• Greiss, Thomas E. West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon (1986) 70pp; all maps are online
• Nafziger, George F. Historical Dictionary of the Napoleonic Era. 2002. 353 pp.
• Nicholls, David. Napoleon: A Biographical Companion. 1999. 300 pp.
• Pope, Stephen. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. (2000). 572 pp.
• Smith, Digby. The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book (1998); 582pp; data on 2000+ individual battles, clashes, sieges, raids, capitulations, and naval engagements

Military

• Adkin, Mark. The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle (2002) 448pp
• Arnold, James R. Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna. (1995). 247 pp.
• Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier (1973), 1216pp; experts call it the best military synthesis
• Connelly, Owen. Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns (2nd ed 2006) negative on Napoleon's skills
• Coote, Stephen. Napoleon and the Hundred Days. (2005). 320 pp.
• Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. Napoleon; A History of the Art of War (1904), old classic online edition
• Duffy, Christopher. Austerlitz, 1805 (1999)
• Duffy, Christopher. Borodino and the War of 1812 (1999).
• Elting, John R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee (1997), influential study
• Epstein, Robert M. Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War (1994) on Austrian war of 1809
• Esdaile, Charles J. The Wars of Napoleon (1995)
• Esdaile, Charles J. The French Wars 1792-1815. (2001). 96pp online edition
• Forrest, Alan. Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire. 2002. 248 pp.
• Gates, David. The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 (1997) 304pp; attacks Connolly and says N's "brilliance as a military commander has rarely been equalled let alone surpassed"
• Gill, John. With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign (1992)
• Goetz, Robert. 1805: Austerlitz; Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition (2005). 368pp
• Griffith, Paddy. The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789-1802, (1998); 304 pp;
• Hamilton-Williams, David. Waterloo: New Perspectives; The Great Battle Reappraised. (1994). 416 pp.
• Kagan, Frederick W. "Russia's Wars with Napoleon: 1805–1815," in The Military History of Tsarist Russia, ed. Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (2002), 106–22.
• Kagan, Frederick W. The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805 (2006) first of four promised volumes; covers the strengths and strategies of all the powers
• Leggiere, Michael V. Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813. 2002. 384 pp.
• Liaropoulos, Andrew N. "Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence - the Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs." Journal of Military History 2006 70(2): 363-384. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in Project Muse
• Lynn, John A. The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94 (1984); influential analysis
• Muir, Rory. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (2000), 466pp
• Nofi, Albert A. The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815. 1993. 333pp online edition
• Nosworthy, Brent. With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies. (1996). 528 pp.
• Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy (1986)
• Pericoli, Ugo.1815: The Armies at Waterloo (1973)
• Riley, J. P. Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting. (2000). 480 pp
• Rogers, H.C.B. Napoleon's Army (1974)
• Rothenberg, Gunther. The Napoleonic Wars (2006) 240pp, well illustrated synthesis by leading scholar
• Rothenberg, Gunther. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon 1978
• Schneid, Frederick C. Napoleon's Italian Campaigns: 1805-1815. (2002); 229pp online edition
• Tarle, Eugene. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. 1942. online edition

Impact on France

• Bergeron, Louis. France under Napoleon (1981), French viewpoint
• Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." French History, 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals
• Furet, François. The French Revolution, 1770-1814 (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
• Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
• Goubert, Pierre. The Course of French History. 1991; French textbook; ch. 14 online edition
• Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution (1994)
• Paxton, John. Companion to the French Revolution (1987), hundreds of short entries.
• Scott, Samuel F. and Barry Rothaus. Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 1789-1799 (1984), short essays by scholars
• Sutherland, D.M.G. France 1789-1815 (1985)

Diplomacy and impact on Europe

• Blanning, T.C.W. The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802 (1996).
• Broers, Michael. Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815 (1996) 291pp, covers everything except the battles
• Bruun, Geoffrey. Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 1938. excellent survey of all of Europe
• Dwyer, Philip G. ed.Napoleon and Europe, (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
• Ellis, Geoffrey. The Napoleonic Empire (1991)
• Grab, Alexander. Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis
• Hill, Peter P. Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815 (2005)
• Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution (1994)
• Muir, Rory. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815. (1996). 466 pp.
• Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," Journal of Military History 54 (April 1990): 131–46. in JSTOR
• Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 in JSTOR
• Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
• Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," Journal of Military History 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
• Schroeder, Paul. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848. 1996; Elaborate detail; advanced history; very hostile to Napoleon; online edition
• Woolf, Stuart. Napoleon's Integration of Europe (1991) 320pp online edition
• Cambridge Modern History (1907) vol 9: Napoleon online edition, older articles by scholars, 900pp

Historiography and Memory

• Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." European History Quarterly 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals
• Dunne, John. "Napoleon: For or against ... and Beyond." History Review. Issue: 27. 1997. pp 17+. online edition
• Geyl, Pieter. Napoleon: For and Against (1949) online edition
• Hazareesingh, Sudhir. "Memory and Political Imagination: the Legend of Napoleon Revisited." French History, 2004 18(4): 463-483. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in Oxford up
• Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)." Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2006 7(2): 283-308. Issn: 1531-023x Fulltext: in Project Muse. Argues Alexander's successful strategy has been neglected
• Pinkney, David. ed., Napoleon: Historical Enigma (1969)

Primary Sources

• Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook. (2002) 213pp online edition

Online resources

• Richard Jensen, ed. Web Sources for Military History (2006)
• War, terror and Resistance
• Napoleon Bonaparte: Internet Guide

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