Vietnamese Communist grand strategy

Template:TOC-right Vietnamese Communist grand strategy certainly is related to that of Mao Zedong, but diverged considerably from his classical three-phase model. In addition, they came up with a phased model of their enemy's behavior, and then tested their theories against it. Since they now control Vietnam, that does suggest that they eventually came up with a viable model.

Countering that argument, however, is the reality that they apparently expected a fairly quick resolution when they invaded Cambodia in 1978, and found themselves enmeshed in 13 years of war. When the press started referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the "Soviets' Vietnam", cynics have called the invasion of Cambodia "Vietnam's Vietnam".

One iconoclastic view of the war comes from Harry Summers, who argued it had always been a conventional war.

Background: the Maoist model

Mao Zedong developed a model of "protracted war" that has been the model for the phases many revolutionary movements:

1. Organization of the covert guerilla force, with individual and small attacks, often using the tactic of terrorism
2. Operations by medium-sized military forces in raids and ambushes, without any attempt to hold ground. These forces could be part-time and melt into the population, or operate from geographic sanctuaries
3. Conventional military confrontation with the intent of capturing and holding ground

In a purely military context, Vo Nguyen Giap called these "defensive, equilibrium, and offensive". North Vietnamese grand strategy, however, evolved another path, especially in changing the third stage from conventional military victory to a victory in a political, diplomatic, or psychological context. While the final victory ending the 1954 war was at the diplomatic table in Geneva, a good deal of conventional warfare led to the table, especially the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

Elliott suggests that the North Vietnamese leadership basically was flexible, and, as early as 1961,had altered their model to cope with the "flexible response" doctrine of the Kennedy Administration, which derived from Maxwell Taylor's earlier work.

Between 1959 and 1965, if not 1972, the Vietnamese politburo changed methods. They went back to something close to Mao's third stage in 1972-1975. Against Cambodia, however, they themselves came closer to their model of western behavior. Against China, yet another model might apply, far closer to a Western model of limited war.

Against the French, the Maoist model certainly applied in its first two stages, although while Dien Bien Phu and other major military actions were clearly conventional, they were not trying to defeat France on its own territory, which would have been the ultimate Phase 3 victory. Their idea of Phase 3 was conventional warfare in a limited area, possibly with a complete defeat of French forces in Indochina, but, as events established, could be ended at the negotiating table in Geneva.

After Geneva, the Maoist model did not seem to fit, for several reasons:

1. China and the Soviet Union, allies and suppliers, did not want a resumption of fighting
2. In 1954, there was to be a referendum on unification in two years, and Hanoi believed it would win
3. Even elections did not occur, the Party believed that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem was so inherently unstable that there would be a popular #General Uprising in the South, which, at most, would need support from paramilitary forces.

Duiker suggests that the definitive Vietnamese version of peoples' war comes from Truong Chinh, in the 1947 Vietnamese-language The Resistance will Win.

With these assumptions, there was no reason to believe, in 1954, that the main forces of the People's Army of Viet Nam would be needed. By 1956, however, Le Duan, then the Party's main representative in the South, began to argue more active measures were needed than organization alone. The Vietnamese have a general term, dau trinh, usually translated as "struggle". There is "political dau trinh" and "military dau trinh", with fine distinctions in the dau trinh article. Le Duan's recommendation was approved by the Politburo at the Eleventh Plenum in December 1956, phrased as enabling the revolutionary movement in the south to defend itself against "counterrevolutionary terror". The form of such defense might itself take the form of terrorism, which is a large part of the Maoist first phase.

Earlier that year, Ho Chi Minh had said, at the Ninth Plenum in April, that the Soviet idea of a "peaceful road to socialism" might not work given the "aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism and its ally in Saigon"; armed dau trinh might be needed. Some of this idea was part of the statement issued by the Conference of Communist Parties of Socialist Parties (Moscow, November 1957) might be needed.

An argument against the need, however, came in their assessment of Western behavior. In July 1962, Le Duan wrote a letter to Nguyen Van Linh analyzing the lessons learned from the negotiated settlement in Laos. He said that the U.S. would not have settled had there not been military success by the guerillas. Had they had too much success, might have provoked a full U.S. intervention. "How far we win, and how far they lose, is very important."

Contrast: the model of western behavior

In his way, Le Duan conceived of an escalation ladder, without the 43 steps described by Herman Kahn, but very much with trigger points that would cause new escalation. The first level was Special War. . The ideal was for the Communists to win at the Special War level, without direct U.S. involvement.

• Special war: the U.S. used South Vietnamese to do the fighting
• Local war (khan chien duc bo): Direct U.S. combat intervention in the South; Le Duan saw this as involving 250,000 to 300,000 troops, but would still fall under the protracted war model. At this point, the revolutionary forces could no longer inflict a "mortal blow" on the enemy.
• "Worst Case": direct Western combat outside the borders of South Vietnam. In September 1965, the Politburo agreed with Le Duan that the U.S. would not attack the North directly, for fear of involving the entire Socialist camp.

Here, Le Duan began to draw some nuanced distinctions. He differentiated from a "decisive victory", typified by Dien Bien Phu, from a "total victory". He believed that "decisive victory" was possible through the General Offensive-General Uprising, even at a U.S. troop commitment of 500,000 troops.

It was not clear what he considered the "worst case". Presumably, he did not consider the symbolic bombings of Operation ROLLING THUNDER to be a full attack on the North. It can only be speculated if bombing of the intensity in Operation LINEBACKER II would have constituted "worst case", or if the "worst case" required a ground invasion of the North. Certainly, other North Vietnamese wrote that they were greatly concerned with even a limited ground invasion that would cut the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Various North Vietnamese have said that a small invasion would have completely disrupted their ability to fight in the south. Bui Tin asked Gen. Le Trong Tan, PAVN Chief of Staff in 1977, how he would have won the war had he been in charge of U.S. forces.

"A slight shift in strategy, nothing earthshaking, would have made all the difference. The Americans needed to deploy no more than a division of troops in the Dong Hoi panhandle (Quang Binh Province) slightly to the north of the 17th parallel, supported by a fleet of ships off the coat. They could have declared this American incursion into North Vietnam was limited in scope, both in terms of time and space. Not offensive in nature, it was required merely to prevent the People's Army of the North from infiltrating into the South. This strategy would have been lethal, because China would have sat idly by, while, our troops were pinned down, defending our rear in the North, which, of course, was our main and unavoidable priority. The military configuration of the war would have flipped. The impetus of the fighting in the South would have reversed itself. The United Stats with impunity could have invaded and withdrawn, invaded and withdrawn, with its mobility guaranteed by the covering fire of the Seventh Fleet

First evolution: General Offensive-General Uprising

This was uniquely Vietnamese contribution to revolutionary theory, and, while it never took place, was the planned endpoint of all other actions. In Western terms, it assumed the populace of the South was the center of gravity; upset it and all else would fall.

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in the the Party theoretical journal Hoc Tap, called for the need to have simultaneous revolutions in production, technology and ideology. In that context, he called for avoiding excessive dependence on external aid, and increasing self-sufficiency, which may have indicated a desire to be independent of Chinese and Soviet pressure.

In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Truong Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khruschev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in a not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." This may reemphasize Thanh's comments above against external dependency.

Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup:

• The Politburo wanted to prevent Southern Communist dominance in an eventual victory, so by introducing Northern troops, they could take away that opportunity
• They thought they would be defeated if they did not take decisive action

They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in a land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam.

Second evolution: adapting to the conventional

Earlier but localized offensives, using armor and artillery, gave an increasingly conventional flavor to the warfare. The 1972 Easter offensive was unquestionably conventional warfare; while neither side used its tanks especially well, nor the North provide close air support, the significant thing was that the North used combined arms including armor, artillery, and both anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, over significant distances.

Palmer suggests that the fall of Phuoc Long Province (now part of Binh Phuoc Province), in January 1975, was the "first real crack" in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, a harbinger of the fall of South Vietnam.