Moral responsibility/Bibliography: Difference between revisions
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*{{cite journal |journal=Mind |volume=106 |pages=423 |date=July 1997 |title=Foundationalism and practical reason |author=Joseph Heath |url=http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~jheath/foundationalism.pdf}} | *An analysis of the role of rational thought in moral decisions: {{cite journal |journal=Mind |volume=106 |pages=423 |date=July 1997 |title=Foundationalism and practical reason |author=Joseph Heath|url=http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~jheath/foundationalism.pdf}} | ||
*A discussion of rehabilitation and its relation to the ideas of free will, determinism and neuroscience: {{cite book |title=Recovery of People with Mental Illness: Philosophical and Related Perspectives |chapter=Some social science antinomies and their implications for the recovery-oriented approach to mental illness and psychiatric rehabilitation |pages=pp. 185 ''ff'' |author=Shlomo Kravetz and Ilanit Hasson-Ohayon |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=on8iJtFaBfoC&pg=PA186 |isbn=0199691312 |year=2012 |publisher=Oxford University Press |editor= Abraham (Rami) Rudnick, ed}} | |||
*Philosophical perspectives upon criminal justice and rehabilitation: {{cite book |title=Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction |author=Roger Hopkins Burke |chapter=Chapter 6: Punishment in modern society |pages=pp. 144 ''ff'' |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=vwF5AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA144 |isbn=0415490979 |year=2011 |publisher=Routledge |edition=Paperback}} | |||
*An annotated listing of works supporting the 'compatibilist' stand on moral responsibility, that is, one assuming that 'moral responsibility' is compatible with the 'laws of nature'. {{cite book |title=Moral Responsibility: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide |editor=Garrath Williams, ed |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=KrfD2j8E4cUC&pg=PA2 |pages=2-24 |isbn=0199808996 |year=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press}} | |||
*According to Garrath Williams, "a significant contribution arguing that the ''relational'' aspects of responsibility attribution are of critical importance. That is, we hold persons responsible within the context of particular relationships...": {{cite book |chapter=Chapter 14: Responsibility |pages=548-587 |author=Christopher Kutz |editor=Jules L. Coleman, Scott Shapiro, eds |title=The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law |isbn= 019927097X |year=2004 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&q=isbn:019927097X}} |
Latest revision as of 15:07, 23 February 2014
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- An analysis of the role of rational thought in moral decisions: Joseph Heath (July 1997). "Foundationalism and practical reason". Mind 106: 423.
- A discussion of rehabilitation and its relation to the ideas of free will, determinism and neuroscience: Shlomo Kravetz and Ilanit Hasson-Ohayon (2012). “Some social science antinomies and their implications for the recovery-oriented approach to mental illness and psychiatric rehabilitation”, Abraham (Rami) Rudnick, ed: Recovery of People with Mental Illness: Philosophical and Related Perspectives. Oxford University Press, pp. 185 ff. ISBN 0199691312.
- Philosophical perspectives upon criminal justice and rehabilitation: Roger Hopkins Burke (2011). “Chapter 6: Punishment in modern society”, Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction, Paperback. Routledge, pp. 144 ff. ISBN 0415490979.
- An annotated listing of works supporting the 'compatibilist' stand on moral responsibility, that is, one assuming that 'moral responsibility' is compatible with the 'laws of nature'. (2010) Garrath Williams, ed: Moral Responsibility: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide. Oxford University Press, 2-24. ISBN 0199808996.
- According to Garrath Williams, "a significant contribution arguing that the relational aspects of responsibility attribution are of critical importance. That is, we hold persons responsible within the context of particular relationships...": Christopher Kutz (2004). “Chapter 14: Responsibility”, Jules L. Coleman, Scott Shapiro, eds: The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press, 548-587. ISBN 019927097X.