Talk:Birthday paradox: Difference between revisions
imported>Boris Tsirelson (→Misleading formulation: advanced theory of Jitse Niesen) |
imported>Sandy Harris (→different calculation: question) |
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:But why the advanced theory of Jitse Niesen, 2008, :-) is outside the article? [[User:Boris Tsirelson|Boris Tsirelson]] 06:40, 9 July 2010 (UTC) | :But why the advanced theory of Jitse Niesen, 2008, :-) is outside the article? [[User:Boris Tsirelson|Boris Tsirelson]] 06:40, 9 July 2010 (UTC) | ||
== A different calculation == | |||
Another way to look at it is that with <math>n</math> people, there are <math>n{n-1)/2</math> possible pairs. For example, with 23 people there are 23*22/2 = 253 pairs. If each pair has an independent 1/365 chance of a match, the overall chance is 253/365. | |||
This appears to give somewhat different results than the calculation in the article. What is wrong? [[User:Sandy Harris|Sandy Harris]] 09:56, 19 October 2010 (UTC) |
Revision as of 03:56, 19 October 2010
Table for data
Is there an easy way to put data, like in this article, into a table? --David W Gillette 14:55, 21 July 2007 (CDT)
- I've just put your data into a table - have a look at how it's constructed. Anthony Argyriou 10:58, 22 July 2007 (CDT)
- Thanks, it looks great.--David W Gillette 15:45, 22 July 2007 (CDT)
Is there a mathematician in the house?
I've just added an article birthday attack on a cryptographic application of the birthday paradox, with a link from here.
Part of the text there is: "In general, for a cryptographic primitive of size n bits, the attack cost is 2n/2." That's a well-known rule among crypto folk; it's in the standard references and is used in government standards, see the last paragraph of birthday attack. However, I've never seen a proof and do not know if it is a theorem or just a handy approximation. Can anyone clarify this? Sandy Harris 13:32, 1 November 2008 (UTC)
- I don't know what a cryptographic primitive is, and the article does not explain it (hint!). But I guess it is something like a hash function. If you use n-bit hash values (each of them equally likely) and then there is a 50% chance of a hash collision if you compute the hash of about 1.18 · 2n/2 pieces of data.
- With n bits there are N = 2n possibilities, so if you take k pieces of data, the probability of a hash collision is (the same formula as in the article):
- Using Stirling's approximation for the factorial and assuming that k is large and N even larger, we find the approximation
- Let me know if you're interested in the details of the computation. So the probability is 50% if
- and solving this yields
- For instance, if N = 365 (which is the case in the article) then you get k = 1.18 · N1/2 = 22.5, which is a pretty good approximation for the size of the group you need to get two people with the same birthday. -- Jitse Niesen 00:48, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- That's all I needed. Thanks. Sandy Harris 02:56, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Misleading formulation
Just for the record: While the calculation is correct, it is badly explained -- persons have no probability. Needs rewrite. --Peter Schmitt 23:57, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
- Please look now. Boris Tsirelson 06:35, 9 July 2010 (UTC)
- But why the advanced theory of Jitse Niesen, 2008, :-) is outside the article? Boris Tsirelson 06:40, 9 July 2010 (UTC)
A different calculation
Another way to look at it is that with people, there are Failed to parse (syntax error): {\displaystyle n{n-1)/2} possible pairs. For example, with 23 people there are 23*22/2 = 253 pairs. If each pair has an independent 1/365 chance of a match, the overall chance is 253/365.
This appears to give somewhat different results than the calculation in the article. What is wrong? Sandy Harris 09:56, 19 October 2010 (UTC)