Models of the stability of states
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If the government has inadequate coercive force, social capital, or authority, its rule will be unstable. To avoid the development of insurgency, either the government must itself build a workable mix of these factors, either on its own or with external assistance. The latter was often the case when the insurgency was directed, by the native population, at a colonial power. Even worse situations arise where a colonial power drew boundaries, as with the Durand Line]] among Afghanistan, India, and the not-yet-existing Pakistan, or with the country of Iraq created by merging three distinct Ottoman governorates of different ethnicity. In these arbitrary assemblages, there may be little sense of social capital]] outside a tribal or religious group: the Pashtun people]] in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Kurd]]s in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. When Gertrude Bell|modern Iraq was created]],[2] it threw ethnic Kurds together with sectarian Shi'a and Sunni; when the Hashemites|Hashemite]] king of Iraq was overthrown and Saddam Hussein]] gained control of the Ba'ath Party]], the Ba'athist elite were overwhelmingly from his home area of Tikrit]]. Samuel Huntington]] defined fault line conflicts]] as between various civilizations within a state. Depending on the granularity with which one defines "civilization", colonial aggregations may be a recipe such conflicts, as in the former Yugoslavia between Slavic and Islamic civilization. In Iraq, there certainly was Islamic sectarian conflict, which could be considered a Cleft country | country cleft]] among Shi'a, Sunni, and possibly Kurd. Even before a state failure, insurgency may flourish due to a lack of social capital, and counterinsurgency|counterinsurgents]] may need to rebuild it. Several studies have addressed it with respect to the Dinka]] and Nuer]] peoples of Sudan]], who have fought against one another and against the central government. The Dinka and Nuer relationship was reexamined in 2010 by Luka Biong Deng]], Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government of South Sudan]], who said that "exogenous" counterinsurgency increased social capital while "endogenous" counterinsurgency reduced it. [3] U.S. foreign internal defense]] (FID) doctrine, as well as the models of NATO]] and allies, assumes a goal is to enable the host nation (HN) and its institutions to move into the realm of those states that both provide for their citizens and interact constructively with the rest of the world. Two broad categories of country need at least some aspects of FID assistance. The obvious category is of weak state|weak]] and failed state]]s, but there are also needs in generally strong states that face specific problems such as terrorism]], piracy]] and illegal drug trade]]. Stability modelsKilcullen's PillarsInsurgency#Kilcullen's Pillars|David Kilcullen]] developed a model identifies the participants in an actual or potential insurgency. Image:KilcullenEcosystem.png| thumb | right |Kilcullen Figure 1: Ecosystem of Insurgency[4]]]It shows a box defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside the box are governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups:
Kilcullen's model is less focused on a hierarchy of command and control, and more on establishing shared values. "Obviously enough, you cannot command what you do not control. Therefore, unity of command (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment." Unity of command is one of the axioms of military doctrine[5] The three pillar model repeats later as part of the #Gaps|gaps to be closed]] to end an insurgency. Image:Kilcullen3Pillars.png| thumb| left |Kilcullen's Three Pillars]] As in Swarming (military)|swarming]], Kilcullen "depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem [i.e., the distributed knowledge of swarms], platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the others’ strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)." McCormick Magic DiamondMcCormick’s model[6] is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model’s strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force. Image:COIN-McCormick.png| thumb |McCormick insurgency model]] The model depicts four key elements or players:
All of these interact, and the different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions:
Barnett and connecting to the coreIn Thomas Barnett's paradigm,[7] the world is divided into a "connected core" of nations enjoying a high level of communications among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate -- that communication can be likened to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied, or in civil war, another paradigm comes into play, which is generally beyond the scope of FID: the leviathan, a first-world military force that takes down the opposition regular forces. Leviathan is not constituted to fight local insurgencies, but major forces. Leviathan may use extensive Swarming (military)|swarming]] at the tactical level, but its dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as NATO]] or ASEAN]]. FID can grow out of the functioning of the "system administrator", be that a single dominant country (e.g., France in Chad), or with a multinational group such as ECOMOG]], the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States]] (ECOWAS), in Sierra Leone. In the Sierra Leonian situation, the primary Leviathan was Great Britain, with Operation Barras]], which involved special reconnaissance]], direct action (military)|direct action]], and hostage rescue]]. Eizenstat and closing gapsBroad views of FID involve closing "gaps",[8] some of which can be done by military advisors and even combat assistance, but, even more broadly, helping the Host Nation (HN) be seen as responsive. To be viable, a state must be able to close three "gaps", of which the first is most important:
Note the similarity between Eizenstat's gaps and Kilcullen's three pillars.[10] External pressures on the 2009 Afghanistan presidential election have been focused on creating legitimacy, as well as coalition-building to replace the Iraq War, insurgency|insurgencies in Iraq]]. Cordesman and SecurityOther than brief "Leviathan" takedowns, security building appears to need to be regional, with logistical and other technical support from more developed countries and alliances (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Noncombat military assistance in closing the security gap begins with training, sometimes in specialized areas such as intelligence. More direct, but still noncombat support, includes intelligence, planning, logistics and communications. It is well to understand that counterterrorism]], as used by Cordesman, does not mean using terrorism against the terrorism, but an entire spectrum of activities, nonviolent and violent, to disrupt an opposing terrorist organization. The French general, Joseph Gallieni]], observed, while a colonial administrator in 1898,
Both Kilcullen and Eizenstat define a more abstract goal than does Cordesman. Kilcullen's security pillar is roughly equivalent to Eizenstat's security gap:
"This pillar most engages military commanders’ attention, but of course military means are applied across the model, not just in the security domain, while civilian activity is critically important in the security pillar also ... all three pillars must develop in parallel and stay in balance, while being firmly based in an effective information campaign."[10] Anthony Cordesman, while speaking of the specific situation in Iraq, makes some points that can be generalized to other nations in turmoil.[12] Cordesman recognizes some value in the groupings in Samuel Huntington]]'s idea in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order]],[13] but, rather assuming the civilizations must clash, these civilizations simply can be recognized as actors in a multinational world. Recruiting for insurgencySocial scientists, soldiers, and sources of change have been modeling insurgency for nearly a century, if one starts with Mao.[14] Counterinsurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another, come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat; see insurgency for the material that deals with factors that predispose toward insurgency. Not all current insurgency is Islamic; South Asia is experiencing a resurgence of Maoist activity. In both cases, social capital also can recruit for insurgency. [15] Social capital is not only useful to the counterinsurgent, but helps the insurgents recruit — "trust based on social networks also plays a big role, because he or she risks everything, including life, by joining the insurgency." Sztompka explains how social capital—like social networks, family, friendship, and religion—helps in taking risk.[16] It is worth noting that several complex insurgent organizations, such as Hezbollah]] in Lebanon]], act, in their areas of control, as shadow governments. Rather like an old-time American political machine, they may be a better place to obtain services than the regular government. Before reform, Tammany Hall]] was the "go-to" place, not the government of New York, New York|New York City]]. Does stabilizing eliminate terror?The term war on terror has been criticized, but there may be utility in examining a war not specifically on the tactic of terror, but in one or more, potentially cooperating insurgencies. "the utility of analyzing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency."[17] Anthony Cordesman]] points out some of the myths in trying to have a worldwide view of terror:[18]
Another problem is that self-radicalization]] of individuals or small groups may come from individual anger, rather than real social breakdown. The worst terrorist incident in the U.S. before 9/11, the Oklahoma City bombing]], was perpetrated by individuals that had been rejected by a number of radical groups. References
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