Analytic-synthetic distinction
The analytic–synthetic distinction is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an ontology into two parts: an analytic part consisting of terms related by synonymy, and a synthetic part concerning connections between such terms and 'real' objects.[1]
Analyticity and empiricism
In several books and papers, Quine challenged the analytic–synthetic distinction.[2] Quine argued that although there are trivial situations in which analyticity prevails (those circumstances which simply replace some elaborate sequence of terms by a tautological equivalent), all interesting propositions in an ontology (all that do not involve simple use of definitions) are synthetic in nature, that is, they inevitably bring forward some empirical fact.
According to Putnam, Quine's position on analyticity is:
| ‘ | “A statement is analytic if it can be turned into a truth of formal logic by substituting synonyms for synonyms.”[3] | ’ |
—Hilary Putnam, ‘Two Dogmas’ revisited | ||
The issue then turns upon whether 'synonym' has a meaning beyond simple tautology. An example involving simple tautology is that All bachelors are unmarried, which holds true simply because, by stipulation, someone is a bachelor if and only if they are unmarried. Quine argued there were no other kinds of analytic statements, and any attempt to extend 'synonymy' beyond such kinds of examples was doomed to failure. Analyticity is possible only by stipulation.
The target here was an interpretation of Carnap's work as saying that synonymy was not just a logical matter, but a matter of usage; stipulation could be extended to certain sense perceptions.[4] Such a view seems to propose the matter of 'analyticity' is one not of logic, but of confirmation.[1]
Interpretation
It is doubtful whether Quine's interpretation of Carnap was accurate. Carnap introduced two types of 'truth' which he called L-truth and F-truth. L-truth was truth by virtue of semantical rules of an adopted language alone and is his definition of 'analytic' truth (L for Logic). On the other hand, F-truth is what Carnap calls synthetic truth and is also described by him as 'contingent' truth, requiring the 'observation of facts' (F for Fact). He points out explicitly that for a statement phrased within a language to be useful, its analytic truth is necessary but has no bearing upon its synthetic truth.[5] The truth of statements, according to Carnap, was not an undeniable consequence of analyticity within their formal structure, that is L-truth alone, but also a matter of F-truth.[6]
Carnap was close to Lewis in thinking that analytic statements were hypothetical and, while tautologically true within their formal structure, could be considered to have some empirical validity only by comparison with experiments.[7] In this respect, Carnap and Lewis agree with Hawking/Mlodinow's proposal of model-dependent realism.[8]
Thomasson says that the focus upon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the Carnap-Quine debate is misplaced; the difference is found in the internal-external distinction (which Quine dismissed as trivial): "The real distinction instead is between existence questions asked using a linguistic framework and existence questions that are supposed to be asked somehow without being subject to those rules—asked, as Quine puts it ‘before the adoption of the given language’."[9]
Price adds that the real argument between Quine and Carnap is not the analytic-synthetic distinction, but is over the issue of multiple languages, "the assumption that there is some sort of principled plurality in language which blocks Quine’s move to homogenize the existential quantifier."[10] This 'homogenization' of Quine's is made possible by Quine's dismissal of the internal-external distinction, the view that these multiple languages are only a plethora of specialized languages, all of which can be subsumed under one general, over-all language. "What is to stop us treating all ontological issues as internal questions within a single grand framework?"[10] One approach to this question is the work of Wittgenstein, who pointed out the futility of looking for the meaning of a term that subsumes all its particular meanings.[11]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Frank X Ryan (2004). “Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic”, John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds: American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press, pp. 36-39. ISBN 020349279X.
- ↑ Perhaps the most famous of these is: Willard Van Orman Quine (1980). “Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism”, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays, 2nd. Harvard University Press, pp. 20 'ff. ISBN 0674323513. See this on-line version.
- ↑ Hilary Putnam (1985). “Chapter 5: ‘Two Dogmas’ revisited”, Hilary Putnam, ed: Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press, pp. 87 ff. ISBN 0521313945.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1946). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago University Press.
- ↑ See Meaning and Necessity, Chapter 1, §2, p. 12.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: pp. 40-50.
- ↑ Clarence Irving Lewis (1991). Mind and the world-order: Outline of a theory of knowledge, Reprint of Charles Scribner's 1929. =Dover. ISBN 0486265641.
- ↑ Hawking SW, Mlodinow L. (2010). The Grand Design, Kindle edition. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-90707-0.
- ↑ Amie L Thomasson. Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology. Retrieved on 04-28-2013. To be published in Ontology after Carnap Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Huw Price (2009). “Chapter 11: Metaphysics After Carnap: the Ghost Who Walks?”, David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman and David Manley, eds: Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press, pp. 320-346. ISBN 0199546045.
- ↑ Jan Woleński (2003). “Carnap's Metaphilosophy”, Thomas Bonk, ed: Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Springer, pp. 27-44. ISBN 1402012063.