Pro-democracy movement in Burma

File:Protest in front of Myanmar Embassy in London.jpg

(CC) Photo: Totaloutnow (flickr account)
Protesters stand facing the Myanmar Embassy in London, holding NLD flags and pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi.

The pro-democracy movement in Burma began in opposition to Ne Win’s military regime in the 1980s. Although Burma had a functioning parliamentary democracy by the late 1950s, internal divisions brought about instability that allowed Ne Win to seize power in a military coup in 1962. A series of protests and escalating violence led to Ne Win’s resignation and replacement by Saw Maung in 1988. With martial law imposed and order restored, the country held a multiparty election in May 1990, in which the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory. The military regime refused to transfer power to the NLD, however, and kept Suu Kyi under house arrest, where she had been since the previous year.

Suu Kyi had become a prominent leading figure in the movement due to her winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and being continually subjected to intermittent house arrests by the government in Myanmar (its official name since the military takeover in 1989). She has had considerable degree of contact with Western governments, which have continued to advocate for her release and place sanctions on the Myanmar regime.

In March, the Myanmar government officially annulled the results of the previous election, citing inconsistency with its current laws. It plans to hold an election sometime later this year.

Past events

Initial course to democracy

When Burma was liberated by the Allies after World War II, it adopted a parliamentary form of democracy. Despite previous exposure to self-rule that was instituted by the British, albeit limited and divorced from the general populace, democracy in Burma lasted for merely 14 years from 1948 to 1962. Burma as a democratic state was not viable from the onset due to its diversity and the colonial legacies. The country is, in fact, one of the most diverse countries in Asia. It has 135 different ethnicities, including 8 major groups. During the period of British occupation in the 19th and early 20th centuries, these divisions were exploited by the colonial policies. The British separately administered the majority lowlands and the minority uplands, subjecting the former to direct rule while providing relative autonomy to the latter. The minorities were favored in the colonial administration as support against the majority, which resulted in the creation of educated local elites in the autonomous upland regions who would compete with the traditional elites of the lowlands. The cultural differences that resulted with the British presence in the lowlands contributed further to the perceived divisions between the two groups. The split was most clearly visible during World War II when the Burmans briefly allied with the Japanese before returning to the side of the Allies, whereas the uplands people stayed with the British all throughout the war.

The strong ethnic divisions contributed to the social instability that intensified the military's involvement in the political affairs. The British precedent and the internal divisions resulted in the drafting of a very weak constitution that provided autonomy provisions for the minority groups and spurred waves of revolts throughout the country upon its signing in 1958. Prime Minister U Nu authorized a "constitutional coup" by General Ne Win to restore order in preparation for the 1960 general elections. When U Nu resigned in 1962 due to divisions within his party (the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League), Ne Win seized power through another military coup and established a socialist state under one-party rule. Newin faced little to no opposition or foreign criticism, since his handling of the previous coup was remembered favorably, and the coup appeared to be a genuinely populist and socialist program.

Under Ne Win's rule

In order to justify the coup and win over the populace, Ne Win's regime adopted a very nationalistic and populist rhetoric. The military coup was explained as necessary means of preserving national unity and establishing socialism. Nationalism became an all-encompassing form of discourse and evaluation that portrayed the state as inherently good by its intent alone while ignoring the actual results. Nationalism also served the dual purpose of suppressing minorities and spreading xenophobia. English was no longer permitted as a medium of instruction, and citizens were denied access to various places and institutions if they could not prove their Burmese ancestry back to 1823. Xenophobia was useful in driving out the foreign entrepreneurial class that might economically challenge the state.

The commitment to socialism was portrayed as a populist and nationalistic agenda. It allowed the state to nationalize all aspects of the economy except for agriculture; as a result, Burma's foreign trade was significantly reduced, and its economic status declined from one of the richest countries in Asia and a major rice exporter to a country dependent on food aid.

The government established nationwide councils which had a negligible degree of decision-making power but was a considerable boast in retaining the loyalty of the peasant and worker class against increasing opposition from the intellectuals. Economic stagnation did not go about without labor unrest and student demonstrations, including a major gathering during a funeral for the former U.N. Secretary General U Thant in 1974, all of which were brutally silenced.

In 1972, Ne Win resigned from the military as to appear as a legitimate civilian leader. A constitution was drafted with the opinions gathered through committees that toured the countryside. It was signed in 1974, and it formally invested power in the People's Assembly with Ne Win as the president.

8888 protests

File:Portrait of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.jpg

(CC) Drawing: Beth Sobel
A portrait of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Despite the success of the government’s public relations campaigns, the public became less and less tolerant of the economic hardships by the late 1980s. This was especially true after Ne Win suddenly promulgated the cancellation of certain currency notes. “As a superstitious man, he wanted only 45 and 90 kyat notes in circulation... because they were divisible by nine, which he considered a lucky number.” In March 1988, a case of petty dispute between college students and townspeople involved a death of one of the students and led to a major anti-government student protest. As with previous demonstrations, the students were met with brutal force by the special riot police. Cover up efforts by the government in the aftermath horrified the public while prompting thousands of students to engage in activities that would send them off to prisons. In hopes cooling the student fervor, the government shut down all of the universities in Burma, but student activism was renewed when the schools were reopened in late June. Again there was violence when the riot police drove a truck against a student march, but this time the witnesses who were enraged by the sight retaliated and killed 8 of the policemen on the spot.

In light of what had happened, Chairman Ne Win convened meetings with the BSPP (Burmese Socialist Program Party) and the national assembly in late July. In these proceedings, the Chairman and the President were replaced by Sein Lwin, who was primarily held responsible for the brutal violence agaherinst the student protestors. Demonstrations became widespread and were attended by all members of the society, unlike the previous student protests. Consequently, the government responded by declaring martial law and banning all public gatherings. But, in defiance to the government, 100,000 people convened in Rangoon on August 8, 1988, a day considered auspicious, when Aung San Suu Kyi “… made a speech at Shwedagon Pagoda and became the public face of the democracy movement.” Unfortunately, the government decided to resort to force again, killing 3,000 and wounding more than 1,000 within a span of five days.

The violence was followed by Sein Lwin’s resignation and replacement by Dr. Maung Maung, who immediately withdrew the army from the streets of Rangoon. Dr. Maung Maung announced that the public would be given a chance to make a referendum for a multiparty rule. The public referendum was already indicated by the large demonstrations occurring almost daily throughout the country, including those that took place on August 23 and 24 with about one million participants. But the government responded by releasing thousands of criminals from its cells, with the intended effect of discouraging political activities, and wiped out the remaining protestors with the troops that were redeployed to the capital and the other major cities.

(CC) Photo: Stephen Brookes
The NLD headquarters in 1997.

With “order” having been restored, Myanmar held a general election on May 27, 1990. The clear winner was the National League for Democracy, which Aung San Suu Kyi had founded the previous year. (It had won 80% of the seats in the parliament.) However, the SLORC refused to transfer power to the NLD and kept Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest.

Current situation

Burma today is again at a critical juncture in its modern history. Sometime later this year, the Burmese junta will hold its first-ever general election since 1990 (Petty, 2010a). Aung San Suu Kyi will be released in November after the election takes place, but she is not permitted to appear in the polls as a political prisoner (Petty, 2010b). The NLD decided to boycott the election to protest the exclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi; this also means that the NLD as an organization will be forced to dissolve and cease operations according to the new election laws (Petty, 2010b). Analysts and international observers remain hopeful, however, since further concessions could be achieved with diplomatic pressure, and the 2010 elections could be the point from which military’s power can begin to be decentralized.

The election in 2010 is consistent with the wider pattern of decentralization and liberalization of the economy observed in the recent years. The country is aiming to revive its agriculture and re-engage in global trade; it is allowing people to have cars and motorcycles; it’s been transferring ownership of formerly state-owned factories, hospitals, and schools to the private sector (“Change Comes to Myanmar," 2010). As General Than Shwe ages closer to his mortal limit, a major concern for him is the risk of another military strongman who might endanger his family. By holding “an election of generals” (Aung, 2010), General Than Shwe aims to both legitimize the succession to the rival generals and decentralize the system to have a way out if the situation goes out of control after succession.

Will the 2010 election result in any progress for democracy in Burma? What are the possibilities for a democratic transformation, and what are the key factors for the different outcomes? There obviously has not been much study since the failure of the 1990 general elections. Ian Holliday, who was aware of the 2010 elections, wrote an article in 2008 accepting both success and failure as possibilities of the election, and emphasizing the importance of outside intervention in facilitating talks and sponsoring grass-root organizations (Holliday 2008: 1052-1058). Interestingly, Holliday points out that the rigged election (with a quarter of the seats reserved for the military) may be the best possible way of transitioning to democracy, since the military leaders will pull out of the process if they feel threatened (Holliday 2008: 1053). Another study from 1997 by Jalal Alamgir recognized the nationwide opposition to the military rule and speculated that Burma will gradually transition into a limited form of democracy that is typical of the ASEAN (i.e. Southeast Asia) countries (Alamgir, 1997: 349-350).

The pro-democracy movement is returning to the political scene in Burma, as the 2010 election has legitimized grass-root political activism in the public sphere, offering it as an alternative to the long-dead modus operandi of student protests that carried risks of incarceration, physical abuse, and death (Burma Watcher, 1989: 175). People will gain significant political capital by exercising their votes and participating in rallies or grass-root organizations (Bochel Bochel et al 2007: 204). The election has also encouraged more political activism as the people are encouraged by the signs of change (Ferrara, 2003: 318). As it was the temporary discontinuation of repression by the regime that triggered the nationwide 888 protests, the Burmese populace is reacting to the 2010 elections by talking about “political turmoil... another uprising like in 1988... bloody attacks, and.... political conflicts” if the election does not meet their expectations (Ferrara, 2003: 307 and Wine 2010).

The election's branding of Burma as a democratic polity establishes toleration of a public dialogue on sensitive political issues (Bohman, 2003: 772-773). The local demand for framework debates questioning the fairness of the political arrangements should be fostered and supplemented by the constant calling for reform from the international community (Holliday, 2008: 1056-1058; Ruwitch, 2010; and Plett, 2010). And, as mentioned previously, it is possible to make constitutional amendments with 75% of the votes in the national parliament.

Next, the election's enabling of “constitutional politics” over core political issues is implicit in the public perception of the wrong in the dissolution of the NLD. (Wine 2010)

The impact of this inconsistency is further magnified when it is supplemented with the assertion that toleration leads to “constitutional politics” over fundamental differences and may ultimately mandate changes in the political system (Bohman, 2003: 757-759). This in the best case scenario would mean a redrafting of the constitution and Aung San Suu Kyi's instatement as the Prime Minister.

The impact of this inconsistency is further magnified when it is supplemented with the assertion that toleration leads to “constitutional politics” over fundamental differences and may ultimately mandate changes in the political system (Bohman, 2003: 757-759). This in the best case scenario would mean a redrafting of the constitution and Aung San Suu Kyi's instatement as the Prime Minister. This is not impossible, given the fact that the military is reserved 25% of the national seats1, and a constitutional revision requires 75% of the votes ("Burma PM 'applies to Form New Political Party'" 2010: Table - Burma's election). And, furthermore, many talented and liberal-minded people are involved with the military because it provides employment and high position in society, and not because they are necessarily loyal to the repressive junta (Ashayagachat 2010). But the more realistic outlook would be that people will gain significant political capital by exercising their votes and participating in rallies or grass-root organizations (Bochel Bochel et al 2007: 204). In conjunction with the liberalization of the economy, this political capital should serve to shift the source of power away from the military, with the result of “introduc[ing] opportunities for a broader range of economic actors to make their interests felt, including many closely associated with the military” (“Change Comes to Myanmar," 2010 and South 2010: 28).

In conjunction with the liberalization of the economy, this political capital should serve to shift the source of power away from the military, with the result of “introduc[ing] opportunities for a broader range of economic actors to make their interests felt, including many closely associated with the military” (“Change Comes to Myanmar," 2010 and South 2010: 28).

The military is reserved 25% of the national seats, and the junta's leadership expects to control more seats with the civilian participation of SLORC, a long-time opponent of the NLD ("Burma PM 'applies to Form New Political Party'" 2010: Table - Burma's election). This could be changed with a constitutional revision, which requires 75% of the parliamentary votes ("Burma PM 'applies to Form New Political Party'" 2010: Table - Burma's election).

With regard to Burma's potential for democratization,

Constitutional politics will be more likely to yield results when the election process transfers the military's political and economic capital to the civilian sector. So far, the election has had the effect of allowing the “third force” (outside the urban-based pro-democracy movement and the ethnic minority coalitions) to mobilize support amount the Burman majority (South 2010: 28). Analysts point out hopelessly that the military has influence over all walks of life in Burma, but this has been primarily economic, beyond which there is no other source of power and acceptance. The military is perceived with tremendous fear and distrust, to the point that the people sense time in two separate dimensions – one created by the military regime with state propaganda and ceremony, and the other “clandestine history of alterity in this new state of emergency is also visible in the scars, broken teeth, and other bodily markers of imprisonment and torture inscribed on the bodies of individual Burmese” (Skidmore 2003). Given the choice between the militaristic SLORC and the civilian candidates, which would the majority of the Burmese vote for? With more economic and institutional liberalization that are undergoing or planned, the military is undermining its hold of the society by accomodating for the rise of independent economic interest groups (Alamgir, 1997: 347). In March of this year, the government began selling confiscated cars, government buildings, farmland, and major stakes in national enterprises such as the airline, fuel import and distribution network, gem and tin mines, and factories ("Myanm'€™s Ruling Junta Is Selling State's Assets," 2010). Many analysts worry that “liberalization has resulted in cartels and monopolies that would only strengthen state power,” and military leaders will be able to achieve economic liberalization while maintaining tight political control (Alamgir, 1997: 347 and "Myanm'€™s Ruling Junta Is Selling State's Assets," 2010). But this is a miscalculation. Further liberalization of the economy could make Burma become more vulnerable to international pressure and sanctions (Ockersz 2010). And the regime's only source of power, other than military force, is its control of the economy, the only thing that is preventing massive dissent from arising. Unlike similar cases of development in China and Vietnam, the desire for democracy and a distaste for repression is widespread – a situation that no amount of nationalistic propaganda would be sufficient to amend (Wine 2010). Another source of pessimissm for democracy in Burma concerns the dangers posed by the ethnic minorities. The democratic transition process will fail because either the country is too diverse8, or the military will revert back political gains by using the threat of ethnic rebellion as an excuse (Mansfield and Snyder, 2009: 384 and Tun 2010). Among academics, the effectiveness of such strategy (of reverting political gains) has been examined within the concept of citizenship, which includes “the commitment to social order and the acceptance of state authority” (Dalton, 2008: 79). In the case of Burma, the imperative to maintain national integrity was first by Ne Win to justify his coup in 1962, and the military rule enjoyed popular support until the violent events leading up to the 8888 Uprising (Alamgir, 1997: 339, 346). But since the brutal massacres of the protesters in summer of 1988, the military has lost all pretense of being an institution “for the people,” and the people not only distrust the government but may in fact sympathize with the minority rebel groups (Gray 2006). Furthermore, a crisis of revolt as an occasion for retracting the democratic gains would not be likely in the first place if they were to carry decentralizing elements far enough to provide a greater local autonomy for the ethnic minorities. The 2010 general elections will have largely positive effects for the pro-democracy movement in Burma. By making political activism a tolerable trend and reducing the political and economic power of the military, the election will pave way for a complete democratization of Burma within the next few decades. It is not reasonable to compare Burma to China or the other Southeast Asian countries and assume that it will stop short of a limited form of democratic gesturing, since there are important historical and cultural differences that are beyond the scope of this work. What's true of Burma is that there is almost a universal demand for democracy among its people. Although much blood has been shed, and much of the movement was silenced with politics of fear after the 8888 protests, it is precisely that enormous amount of loss, drama, and waiting that will make the people accept nothing short of a complete democratic transformation. The unfair election rules, including the reservation of 25% of the national and 33% of the local seats to the military, do not necessarily have to amount to much at all. The people may vote for the new NDF formed by the former members of the NLD, or they may choose fresh candidates of the “third force,” but they will never vote for the militaristic SLORC, just as the NLD had won a landsliding victory with 80% of the votes in the 1990 general elections. At that point, General Than Shwe will be unable to do anything to undo the progress that will have been made from this point, despite all his wealth and connections. After all, he is now just a civilian; without the votes, he cannot sustain his leadership by staging another coup de tat. As for the military, it should gradually fade away from politics as civilians and the private sector take over the economy.

In recent years, Myanmar has been flip-flopping between change and repression. The much-needed progress may be achieved with the general elections planned in 2010. “A common explanation for the change in direction is that General Than Shwe is dismantling his system of absolute power because he does not want another strongman to emerge who could hurt his family or threaten the wealth he seems to have built up during nearly two decades in power.”