Great Depression in the United States
The Great Depression in the United States of America was part of an international economic crisis that was longer and deeper than any that have happened before or since. It had a profoundly damaging effect upon welfare and morale of the people of the United States, depriving many of jobs, homes and savings, creating widespread poverty, and destroying a previous mood of optimism. It started eleven years after the end of the First World War and was not over until the outset of the Second World War.
Its effect upon many Americans was reflected in a popular song of the time that include the lines:
- They used to tell me I was building a dream...
- ... once I built a railroad; now it's done ...
- ... brother, can you spare a dime?
- "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime," lyrics by Yip Harburg, music by Jay Gorney (1931)
The causes of that international disaster are discussed in the article on the Great Depression.
The following article provides only a factual account of what happened to the American economy and to the American people.
Links and subpages
- For an annotated chronology of the main events, see the Timelines subpage;
- for an article about events in the United States and elsewhere, see the article on the Great Depression;
- for a summary of the relevant economic statistics, see the Tutorials subpage;
- for definitions of terms shown in italics see the Glossary.
Overview
Background (1918 - 23)
The condition of the United States in the 1920s differed markedly from its pre-war condition. The wartime destruction of much of Europe's productive capacity had made it the richest country in the world, and Europe's wartime borrowing had made the United States the largest creditor.
After the end of the war, the full convertability of the dollar into gold under the gold standard which had been suspended during the war, was immediately resumed. The shock of the ending of wartime production led to a minor recession that was followed by a resumption of strong output growth. A few years later there occurred severest bout of deflation ever experienced in the United States when wholesale prices fell by 56% in a little over a year, following an attempt to end wartime inflation by a tightening of the federal budget, and sharp reduction in the monetary base. [1].
In 1921 Warren Harding became President and pushed through a programme of tax reductions, farming subsidies, tariffs and immigration restrictions.
In 1923 a committee appointed by Herbert Hoover (then Commerce Secretary) published a 300-page report on the subject of recessions and the associated unemployment [2]. The committee had regarded it as inevitable that every boom would be followed by a slump, and had considered how a future boom could be restrained and how the following downturn could be countered. Among their recommendations were the postponment of commercial and public investment projects from times of expansion to times of contaction, and the control of credit expansion by the banks. Although he endorsed those recommendations at the time, he subsequently proposed severe limits upon the government's ability to act upon them. He has been quoted as saying - at the depth of the depression - that there should be "...no tampering or inflation of the currency"; that the budget should be "unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary"; and that "the Government credit [should] be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities" - which John Kenneth Galbraith took to amount to the rejection of both fiscal policy and monetary policy actions in face of a depression[3]
Monetary policy in the 1920s was dominated by Benjamin Strong, a participant in the creation of the Federal Reserve System and first governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong maintained a close relationship with Montague Norman of the Bank of England, and in 1924 he maintained low interest rates in the United States, which by making the dollar lesss attractive, and sterling more attractive to investors, drove up the foreign exchange value of the British currency and facilitated Britain's return to the gold standard and in 1927 he forced through the Federal Reserve System a decrease in the discount rate from 4 to 3 percent which is quoted to have called "un petit coup de whisky for the stock exchange". This appeared to have been influenced by the previous Long Island meeting of central bankers of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany to discuss means of strengthening Britain's gold reserves and of the general European currency situation [4].
Boom (1923 - 29
Following the election of Calvin Coolidge to the Presidency, the mid-1920s came to be known as the "Coolidge Prosperity". Having declared that "the chief business of the American people is business" the President persuaded Congress to give private business substantial encouragement, including construction loans, profitable mail-carrying contracts and other indirect subsidies [5]. America experienced rapid increases in mass production and mass consumption, turning it into the richest society in the world. It saw the birth of what came to be known as the "American Dream" - a "dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement" [6] and became a modern middle-class economy of radios, consumer appliances, automobiles and suburbs with about one American in five owning a motor vehicle. It also became a land of great inequality, with the richest one percent of U.S. households holding an estimated 45 percent of national wealth, [7]. Hire-purchase became increasingly popular [8], and an increase in the use of stockbrokers' margin accounts for the purchase of stocks. Holidays in the Florida sun were growing in popularity, plots were being assigned to anyone able to pay a 10 per cent deposit and land prices were driven up initially by a growth in demand by prospective builders, but later by speculators; creating a "bubble" that finally burst, with a collapse of land prices, in 1926.
Slump (1929-31)
The boom in economic activity continued in the following years and is believed to have intensified after the 1927 monetary relaxation and it was then accompanied by rapid rises in prices on the New York Stock Exchange. Influenced, perhaps, by the Florida land price, bubble it was widely supposed that this, too was a speculative bubble that would inevitable burst with damaging consequences. The 1923 report had recommended the use of monetary policy to counter such speculation and in 1928 some members of the Federal Reserve Board became convinced that a tightening of monetary policy had become necessary and by July of 1928 the the discount rate had been raised in New York to 5 per cent, the highest since 1921 and the System's holdings of government securities had been reduced from a level of over $600 million at the end of 1927 to $210 million by August 1928 [1]. Benjamin Strong expressed reservations about that policy, but he died in October and the policy was supported by his successor, George Harrison, and the discount rate was raised a further point to 6 per cent in the following year. Disaster followed. During September and October of 1929 production fell at an annual rate of 20 per cent, wholesale prices at a rate of 7.5 percent and personal income at a rate of 5 per cent, and after the October stock market crash, the economy declined even faster. The Federal Reserve Board's desire to slow outflows of gold to France then led to a further tightening of monetary policy [9].In the autumn of 1931 there was another tightening of monetary policy, following the UK's sterling crisis. A wave of speculative attacks on the pound had forced Britain to leave the gold standard and, anticipating that the United States might the next to do so, speculators turned their attention from the pound to the dollar causing an outflow of gold, which was stemmed by an increase in the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York[10].
Banking Crises (1930 - 33)
There was a substantial reduction in the profitability of banking investments between 1929 and 1939 [11] and a series of bank failures in the South and the Midwest led to attempts by depositors to convert their deposits into cash. That produced a 'contagion of fear' that culminated in a run on the country's fourth largest bank, which had the grandiloqent name of "Bank of the United States", leading to its total collapse [12]. That failure further intensified depositors' mistrust of the banks, and more severe banking crises followed in 1931 and 1932, and by 1933, nearly half of the banks that had existed in 1929 had gone out of business, and most of the rest had suffered heavy losses. The loss of nearly half of the banking system and the depleted reserves of the remainder led to what is now called a "credit crunch", during which householders, farmers and small businesses found credit to be expensive and hard to get, and a widespread loss of confidence in the country's financial institutions. The financial system was further disrupted by widespread defaults among mortgage holders and by insolvencies among small firms.
Those developments were associated with a progressive deepening of the depression, and by 1933 about half of the country's industrial production capacity was idle and more than a fifth of its workforce was unemployed [13].
Social Consequences (1930-36)
The transition from the popular outlook of the "roaring twenties" to the sombre view of the "hungry thirties" was not immediate. At first the downturn seemed no worse than those that had happened before and there were reassuring forecasts of imminent recovery. Towards the end of 1930, however, the mood began to change. More and more often, jobs were being lost, savings were running out, and homes were being repossessed; and and as time passed, more and more people were leaving their communities in search of work. A nationwide census of the homeless in the care of various agencies taken in January 1933, yielded a total of 370 thousand, and when an estimate of those sleeping outdoors was added, the total rose to at least 1.2 million [14]. By that time, thousands of families were sheltering in cardboard shacks in "Hoovervilles" in many American cities, hundreds of thousands were roaming the country in search of jobs, and many families were experiencing hunger and malnutrition [15]. Those who were already poor suffered further hardship. According to the Brookings Institution, nearly 60% of American families had already been unable to buy basic necessities in 1929, and their incomes often declined further in the 1930s [16]. Thirty-four million men,women and children had no income at all [17]. Even in 1937, the President of the United States was to say " I see millions of citizens - a substantial part of the population - who are at this very moment deprived of the bare necessities of life. I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished."[18].
Rescue (1933-34)
The New Deal had three components: a relief component that was intended to put the unemployed to work and help those hardest hit by the depression; a recovery component that was intended to return the country to prosperity; and a reform component that was intended to improve the performance of the economy. Of those, it was the relief component that had the greatest impact. In comparison, the effectiveness recovery component has been a matter of controversy. It included only a minor [19] fiscal stimulus, and its influence upon the recovery is thought to have been mainly psychological. The reform component may at the time have been its most controversial because it implied a belief that the future stability of the economy would depend to some extent upon the effectiveness with which it would be regulated.
(The New Deal is descibed in detail in an article with that title, and its economic implications are discussed in the article on the Great Depression.)
Recovery (1933-37)
Recovery took time --by 1939 GDP per adult was still 27% below trend.[20]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 (p. 289), Princeton University Press for NBER, 1963
- ↑ Business Cycles and Unemployment, Report and Recommendations of a Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment, McGraw Hill, 1923
- ↑ John Kenneth Galbraith The Great Crash 1929, Penguin Books 1992
- ↑ Priscilla Roberts: Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the limits to interwar American nationalism: Part II: Strong and the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s, Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond , Spring 2000
- ↑ "War, Prosperity and Depression", Chapter 9, An outline of American History, The United States Information Agency 2008
- ↑ James Truslow Adams: The Epic of America, Little Brown & Co, 1931
- ↑ Bradford De Long: "The Roaring Twenties", Economic History of the United States Chapter XII, 1997
- ↑ Sharon Murphy: "The Advertising of Installment Plans" in Essays in History, Vol 37, The Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia, 1995
- ↑ James Hamilton: Monetary Factors in the Great Depression, Journal of Monetary Economics, 1987
- ↑ For a more detailed account of the monetary policy of the period see par 1.2.3 of the tutorials subpage of the article on the Great Depression [1]
- ↑ Elmus Wicker: The Banking Panics of the Great Depression, Cambridge University Press 2000
- ↑ Michael Bordo (Ed): Money, History and International Finance: Essays in the Honor of Anna J Schwartz, NBER Conference Report, University of Chicago Press, 1989
- ↑ See the industrial production and unemployment statistics on the tutorials subpage
- ↑ Joan M. Crouse: The Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929-1941, State University of New York Press, 1986
- ↑ Great Depression and World War II, Learning Page, Library of Congress 2008
- ↑ James R. McGovern: And a Time for Hope: Americans in the Great Depression, Praeger, 2000
- ↑ Russell Freedman Children of the Great Depression, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005
- ↑ Franklin D Roosevelt: Second Inaugural Adress, January 1937
- ↑ The fiscal stimulus involved deficits that were less than 2.5% of GDP - which must be considered minor in relation to a 40% downturn in GDP
- ↑ Cole, Harold L and Ohanian, Lee E. New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 2004.