Iraq Study Group

U.S. President George W. Bush with co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group Lee Hamilton (left) and James Baker (right). Wednesday, December 6. 2006. Template:Photo

The Iraq Study Group (ISG), also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission, was a bipartisan panel charged with assessing the situation in Iraq. It was appointed March 15, 2006 and published its report, which included 79 policy recommendations, on its website December 6, 2006. The ISG was led by Republican James Baker, a former Secretary of State, and Democrat Lee Hamilton, a former U.S. Representative.

Members of the Iraq Study Group

In addition to the two chairs, the ISG was made up of eight members from public service, four from the Republican Party and four from the Democratic Party. The members were:

Republicans

• Sandra Day O'Connor, former Supreme Court Justice
• Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State
• Edwin Meese III, former US Attorney General
• Alan Simpson, former U.S. Senator from Wyoming

Democrats

• Vernon Jordan, Jr., business executive
• Leon E. Panetta, former White House Chief of Staff
• William J. Perry, former US Secretary of Defense
• Charles Robb, former U.S. Senator from Virginia

Republican Rudy Giuliani resigned as a member on May 24, 2006. He was replaced by Edwin Meese. Republican Robert Gates resigned November 8, 2006, after being nominated by President George W. Bush to replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. He was replaced by Lawrence Eagleburger.

Summary of ISG Report Findings

The ISG Report appeared at a time when the situation in Iraq was dire. As the main reason why current US policy was not working in Iraq, the panel cited the lack of national reconciliation among Iraqis.The panel provided in total 79 recommendations which they believed would strengthen Iraq, the Middle East, and the United States of America.

Assessment

In assessing the situation prevailing in Iraq in 2006, the Baker-Hamilton commission included the following aspects:

1. Security ¶ Security in Iraq had declined rapidly during 2006—one of the reasons why the ISG was formed in the first place. The commission concluded that peaking violence was to be ascribed to various different sources, including "the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality." While the highest number of attacks came from the Sunni insurgents, al Qaeda was said to be responsible for some high-profile attacks. The report also outlined the difficulties experienced by both US and Iraqi forces in combating the violence, including the strain suffered by military units because of the multiple tours of duty in Iraq and the incomplete or defective equipment. Iraqi forces, the report concluded, were nowhere near capable of securing Iraq. The Iraqi Army was not making enough progress, while the Iraqi police and the Facilities Protection Service were openly accused of incompetence, corruption, and subversiveness.
2. Politics ¶ The commission concluded that the functioning of the Iraqi government was hindered by the prevailing sectarian viewpoints among government officials. As a result, not enough progress was being made on a number of key issues, such as national reconciliation, de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, federalism, security, and corruption.
3. Economics ¶ The ISG Report commented that insecurity, corruption and old infrastructure was impeding economic progress in Irag. It was believed that the oil sector would be the the driving force behind economic growth, but at the time, oil production was being hampered by old technology and targeted insurgent attacks on Iraq's oil transporting infrastructure.
4. International Support ¶ The panel expressed pessimism about the lack of international support for rebuilding efforts in Iraq. It accused Iran and Syria of collaborating with insurgents in Iraq and complained that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were too "passive and disengaged." Jordan and Egypt were commended for their cooperation.

Policy Alternatives

The panel assessed four policy alternatives on Iraq:

1. Precipitate Withdrawal ¶ This alternative was rejected as it was believed that this would lead to further deterioration and would almost certainly require a return of American troops in the near future.
2. Staying the Course ¶ This alternative was rejected as the ISG Report outlined that current policy was not working.
3. More Troops for Iraq ¶ This alternative was rejected because the panel did not believe increased military strength could solve the underlying problems in Iraq.
4. Devolution to Three Regions ¶ This alternative was rejected because the panel believed sectarian boundaries could not be drawn without causing "mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions."

The External Approach (Recommendations 1-18)

The ISG recommended that the United States launch a diplomatic "offensive" in the Middle East to elicit help from Iraq's neighbors in quelling the rising violence in Iraq. In particular, the report proposed the Bush administration engage both Iran and Syria in direct negotiations, using both incentives and disincentives (Recommendations 9-12). The report also stated that "the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict" (Recommendations 13-17).

Responses to the ISG Report

Foreign Media and Politicians

The Israeli government rejected the ISG Report. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert criticized the report's finding that key to solving the problems in Iraq was to address the plight of the Palestinians.

The Bush Administration

Work in Progress

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Bibliography

James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton et al. The Iraq Study Group Report. The Way Forward—A New Approach. Authorized Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 2006. ISBN 9780307386564

The Iraq Study Group Report full text (PDF)