Korean War

The Korean War has been called America’s “forgotten war”, neglected on the timeline between the twin cataclysms of World War II and Vietnam. The stage for war was set back in the late summer of 1945, when the White House and the Kremlin agreed on a demarcation line (38° N latitude) dividing Korea into two halves, with the Communist Russians controlling the North and the United States acting as policeman for the Republic in the South. Following this agreement, the superpowers ceased to concern themselves much with the country of Korea. In 1948 and 1949 both Russia and America withdrew the majority of their forces from Korea.

Map of the divided Korea

The United States was committed to a containment strategy for the Cold War, based on the concepts of George Kennan.

Origins

Douglas MacArthur did not assume he would defend Korea in the event of an invasion of the South; he saw his responsibility as defending Japan, Okinawa, and the Marianas, as well as the sea and air approaches to this area. This was not opposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, in January 1948, told the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), roughly the first level below the National Security Council, in January 1948, that withdrawing U.S. occupation troops in Korea would lead to Communist domination. Since it still was intended to withdraw the U.S. forces, what was seen as Soviet control was inevitable. Establishing a ROK "constabulary" would merely delay the inevitable. The JCS saw Korea as totally wrong from a strategic and operational standpoint; it would be fighting in a place where all the advantages would be those of the adversary. On 4 April 1948, the President approved a policy saying

The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States.

The last U.S. tactical units were out of South Korea in 1949, leaving only advisors. MacArthur had no further reponsibility for defending Korea, with no troops there.

In mid-1949, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley suggested taking the Korean question again to the National Security Council, before the last U.S. troops left. He feared that U.S. withdrawal might be followed by an invasion from the north. His recommendation was to withdraw U.S. nationals in the event of an invasion, present the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Bradley suggested a United Nations military force might be the last resort.

Failure to anticipate

Failure to anticipate the attack on the South was, in part, a result of the combined cutbacks in military and intelligence budgets after World War II, and the containment strategy against the Soviet bloc, which was principally focused on the Soviet Union itself, on China to a lesser extent, and essentially ignoring small bloc states such as North Korea. Schnabel suggests that this was only logical after the U.S. had written off Korea as strategically significant.

There was U.S. intelligence activity by the U.S. Korea Military Assistance Group (KMAG), who worked with ROK counterparts to analyze intelligence on North Korea. KMAG reported to Washington, not MacArthur/ It had the intelligence responsibility, sent reports to Washington, which sent it, along with CIA and other reports, to MacArthur. They sent this information to Washington periodically and on occasion made special reports. Other agencies and units in the Far East reported to appropriate officials in Washington. Communications intelligence monitored North Korean communications only to the extent that they provided information on Soviet activities.

An additional problem was that Douglas MacArthur wanted intelligence under his direct control. During the Second World War, he had not allowed the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Strategic Services, to operate in his theater. U.S. intelligence, especially clandestine human-source intelligence, was in a bureaucratic limbo between 1945 and 1952, when the CIA obtained firm control of clandestine HUMINT and covert action.

Instead, he kept his own intelligence organization under his trusted intelligence officer, MG Charles Willoughby. In early 1950, General J. Lawton Collins asked MacArthur if he could provide information on areas outside his responsibility. MacArthur was reluctant to commit to regular reporting without orders to do so, but he thought he had the personnel to do so. ref name=Schnabel />

"By late 1949, the KLO was reporting that the Communist guerrillas represented a serious threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK)..." Willoughby also claimed that the KLO had 16 agents operating in the North. KLO officers in Seoul, however, expressed suspicion regarding the loyalty and reporting of these agents. Separate from Willoughby's command, then-Capt. John Singlaub had established an Army intelligence outpost in Manchuria, just across the border from Korea. Over the course of several years, he trained and dispatched dozens of former Korean POWs, who had been in Japanese Army units, into the North. Their instructions were to join the Communist Korean military and government, and to obtain information on the Communists’ plans and intentions.

Still, CIA did have an analytic function under its control, and issued reports. While its 16 July 1949 Weekly Summary dismissed North Korea as a Soviet "puppet", the 29 October Summary suggested a North Korean attack on the South is possible as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there.

"These reports establish the dominant theme in intelligence analysis from Washington that accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack—that the Soviets controlled North Korean decisionmaking. The Washington focus on the Soviet Union as “the” Communist state had become the accepted perception within US Government’s political and military leadership circles. Any scholarly counterbalances to this view, either questioning the absolute authority of Moscow over other Communist states or noting that cultural, historic, or nationalistic factors might come into play, fell victim to the political atmosphere."

By April 1950, U.S. Army communications intelligence made a limited "search and development" study of DPRK traffic. CIA received its reports. The COMINT revealed large shipments of bandages and medicines from the USSR to North Korea and Manchuria, starting in February 1950. These two actions made sense only in hindsight, after the invasion of South Korea occurred in June 1950.

By the spring of 1950, North Korea’s preparations for war had become...recognizable. Monthly CIA reports describe the military buildup of DPRK forces, but also discount the possibility of an actual invasion. It was believed that DPRK forces could not mount a successful attack without Soviet assistance, and such assistance would indicate a worldwide Communist offensive. There were no indications in Europe that such an offensive was in preparation.

Some North Korean communications were intercepted between May 1949 and April 1950 because the operators were using Soviet communications procedures. Coverage was dropped once analysts confirmed the non-Soviet origin of the material.

A surprise attack

In hindsight, there were warnings, in May-June 1950, of a potential attack in the near future. On 10 May, the South Korean Defense Ministry publicly warned at a press conference that DPRK troops were massing at the border and there was danger of an invasion...Throughout June, intelligence reports from South Korea and the CIA provide clear descriptions of DPRK preparations for war. These reports noted the removal of civilians from the border area, the restriction of all transport capabilities for military use only, and the movements of infantry and armor units to the border area. Also, following classic Communist political tactics, the DPRK began an international propaganda campaign against the ROK police state.

The U.S. had much smaller forces than in the Second World War. "In June 1950, the strength of the active Army stood at about 591,000 and included ten combat divisions. About 360,000 troops were stationed within the zone of the interior (ZI). The remaining 231,000 were disposed in overseas commands, most of them performing occupation duties. The largest group overseas (about 108,500) was located in the Far East..."<

Location	Strength
Zone of the Interior (USA)	360,000
Far East	108,500
Other overseas	122,500

On 6 June, CIA informed U.S. policymakers that all East Asian senior Soviet diplomats were recalled to Moscow for consultations. Unfortunately, it was assumed this was to consult about a new plan to counter anti-Communist efforts in the region. On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on HUMINT, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President Harry S Truman, United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and United States Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson all received copies of this report.

On June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung, the leader of Communist North Korea, sent troops of the North Korea People’s Army (NKPA) across the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, heading toward its capital, Seoul. According to historian David Halberstam, “South Korea became important only after the North Korean Communists struck in the night; its value was psychological rather than strategic—the enemy had crossed a border.”

MacArthur's headquarters "learned of the attack six and one-half hours after the first North Korean troops crossed into South Korea. The telegram bearing the news from the Office of the Military Attaché in Seoul reported:

  Fighting with great intensity started at 0400, 25 June on the Ongjin
  Peninsula, moving eastwardly taking six major points; city of Kaesong
  fell to North Koreans at 0900, ten tanks slightly north of Chunchon,
  landing twenty boats approximately one regiment strength on east
  coast reported cutting coastal road south of Kangnung; Comment: No
  evidence of panic among South Korean troops.

A message ninety minutes later gave confirmation. General MacArthur immediately informed Washington and, within a few hours, sent the first comprehensive situation report on the Korean fighting."

Early Response

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of American Forces in the Far East, and seventy years old at the time, was ordered to sort out the problem. MacArthur, headquartered in Toyko, flew to South Korea on June 27. The Eighth U.S. Army in Japan was on the way by June 30. The Americans would help defend South Korea from the Communist invaders. President Truman deemed America’s effort a “police action”. It would be the first time in the post-World War II environment that America would fight communism directly, on the field.

The Search for Resources

In Washington, D.C. on July 19, President Truman asked Congress to approve an emergency defence appropriation of $11 billion. Truman, like Roosevelt before him in 1940, wanted 50,000 war planes built a year. Congress appropriated $8 billion for aircraft production for 1951.

Early intelligence analysis

CIA intelligence reports, after the invasion, still treated North Korea as controlled by the USSR, but the reports did raise the possibility of Chinese involvement. On 26 June, CIA agreed with the US Embassy in Moscow that the North Korean offensive was a “... clear-cut Soviet challenge to the United States…”

..the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step..." is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities. The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.”

CIA, the State Department, and the three service intelligence agencies agreed with this estimate.

"...General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950.

On 30 June 1950, [as] President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces in Korea, CIA Intelligence Memorandum 301, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression, warned that the Soviets could commit large numbers of Chinese troops, which could be used in Korea to make US involvement costly and difficult. This warning was followed on 8 July by CIA Intelligence Memorandum 302, which stated that the Soviets were responsible for the invasion, and they could use Chinese forces to intervene if DPRK forces could not stand up to UN forces.

Difficulty in collecting intelligence

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, United States Army Special Forces did not yet exist, and there was a turf war over paramilitary actions between Willoughby's G-2 group and an interim group only partially under CIA control, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). A heavily censored history of CIA operations in Korea shows that "Flight B" of the Fifth Air Force supported air support for both military and CIA special operations. When CIA guerillas were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA history, "The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial." Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme northeast, and the Army in the West.

The Bugout

Initially, the North Koreans drove South Korean and US troops back, quickly capturing Seoul.

Pusan Perimeter

The United Nations defending forces were able to consolidate and hold the area around the port of Pusan.

September-November 1950

This was the period when the U.S. decided to repulse the North Korean offensive. An amphibious invasion, at the difficult landing area of Inchon, appears to have completely surprised by the North Koreans. They fell back, as other forces headed north out of the Pusan Perimeter, putting the DPRK in a pincers. The key decision point, however, came when MacArthur continued the pursuit aross the 38th parallel, the border between the two Koreas.

Battle of Inchon

On 8 September, the CIA issued Intelligence Memorandum 324, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, which assumed that the Chinese were already providing covert assistance to the DPRK, including some replacements for combat troops. ... The memorandum ... noted that reports of Chinese troop buildups in the Manchurian border area made intervention well within Chinese capabilities. ... but again insisted the Soviets were not willing to risk general war.

Approach to Inchon Invasion

Bombardment of the Inchon area started on September 13, but the North Koreans were still surprised by an amphibious invasion, by U.S. and South Korean fores at the port of Inchon on 15 September. Inchon had some of the most extreme tidal range on the planet, poor beaches, and small channels. It was an unlikely target for a landing. MacArthur had argued for this specific landing, in spite of objections from senior military commanders.

Once the beachhead was secure, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved toward Seoul, taking Kimpo airfield on the 17th, after which it was used to provide close air support. In the meanwhile, 100 miles southeast of Inchon, UN forces broke out of Pusan on the 16th.

The Inchon and Pusan forces linked up on 27 September, and Seoul was liberated, although devastated by street fighting, on 29 September. North Korean forces were in retreat.

A hundred miles to the southeast, the Pusan Perimeter's defenders went on the offensive on 16 September. After resisting for a few days, the now-isolated North Korean army retreated and progressively collapsed during the rest of the month. On the 27th, U.S. Army units moving southwards from Seoul met those coming up from Pusan.

ut President Truman made a fateful decision which led to the war dragging on for two more years. He gave MacArthur orders to give chase.

Chinese intervention

On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary had stated that 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces." Again, the tactical warning of a Chinese force were rejected based on a strategic assessment of Soviet intentions

Chairman Mao of the People's Republic of China (PRC) warned the U.S. not to travel north of the 38th parallel, yet the American forces invaded North Korea anyway on October 7.Template:Fact By November, the nature of the war had changed.

"On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50, entitled Critical Situations in The Far East—Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950...On 13 and 14 October, the 38th, 39th, and 40th Chinese Field Armies entered Korea. The intelligence leadership in both Washington and Tokyo did not alert either President Truman or MacArthur, who were about to meet on Wake Island to discuss the conduct of the war.U S military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.

CIA reporting from Tokyo, based on information obtained from a former Chinese Nationalist officer sent into Manchuria to contact former colleagues now in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), stated that the PLA had over 300,000 troops in the border area. A CIA-led irregular ROK force operating on the west coast near the Yalu river reported, on October 15, that Chinese troops were moving into Korea.

All this information subsequently turned out to be accurate. At that meeting, on 15 October, MacArthur told Truman there was little chance of a large-scale Chinese intervention. And, he noted, should it occur, his air power would destroy any Chinese forces that appeared.

The next day, the CIA Daily Summary reported that the US Embassy in The Hague had been advised that Chinese troops had moved into Korea. At this point, the analytic perspective of the Agency shifted somewhat... The Agency also abandoned the position that the Chinese had the capability to intervene but would not do so, and began to accept that the Chinese had entered Korea. But it held firm to its view that China had no intention of entering the war in any large-scale fashion.

Battle lines north of the 38th Parallel, 23 November 1950

By the end of November 300,000 Chinese troops were in combat. Back in America, more than a few government officials as well as journalists wondered if this was the beginning of World War III. On December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a National Emergency, warning the American people, “The increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as quickly as possible.”

winter of 1950-51 to the early summer of 1951

during which time the conflict shifted from a dangerous struggle that at any moment could have expanded into a regional or even a global war to a relatively static struggle characterized at the top level on both sides by a willingness to end the fighting short of clear-cut victory.

US analysis in the winter

In December 1950, with the Korean War in progress, the Central Intelligence Agency issued National Intelligence Estimate 15: "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation".

It began with the estimate that "USSR-Satellite treatment of Korean developments indicates that they assess their current military and political position as one of great strength in comparison with that of the West, and that they propose to exploit the apparent conviction of the West of its own present weakness." At this time, there was no assumption that China and the USSR would differ on any policy "Moscow, seconded by Peiping with regard to the Far East, has disclosed through a series of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation:

a. Withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and of the Seventh Fleet from Formosan waters.

b. Establishment of Communist China as the predominant power in the Far East, including the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

c.Reduction of Western control over Japan as a step toward its eventual elimination.

d. Prevention of West German rearmament.

"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiations, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of the situation." Such a stand did take place, and the war ended in a stalemate.

MacArthur recalled

General MacArthur was recalled back to Washington, D.C. on April 11, 1951.

General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the UN forces in the Far East and General James A. Van Fleet of the Eighth Army in Korea. America was destined for two more years of scattershot combat and futile negotiations. U.S. defense budget for 1951 was $48.3 billion; for 1952, $62.2 billion; for 1953, $53.2 billion.

July 1951-April 1953

"armistice negotiations, from their beginning in July 1951 through to their stalemate over the prisoner-of-war issue in the spring of 1952 and their suspension by the United States in the following autumn."

Truman's farewell

Before the war came to a close President Truman would reach the end of his first elected term as President and chose not to run again. During his farewell radio address to the American people on January 15, 1953, Truman said this:

"In Korea our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought—because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic. . . . Now, once in a while I get a letter from some impatient person asking, Why don’t we get it over with? Why don’t we issue an ultimatum—make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: we are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom."

April 1953-July 1953

The Korean War dragged on until an armistice was signed between North Korea, the United States, and China on July 27, 1953. According to the official count, 33,629 American soldiers were killed in action on the battlefield in the Korean War, mostly by Chinese—not North Korean—divisions. 110,000 Americans were wounded or missing-in-action. The UN forces lost 60,371. The U.S. Army estimate of enemy killed exceeded one million, the majority Chinese troops. The war-torn landscape of the Korean peninsula, after three years of ground fighting and saturation bombardment by American air power, was in ruins.

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