Imperial Japanese Navy: Difference between revisions
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From its beginning during the [[Meiji Restoration]] in 1869, to its [[World War II]] defeat in 1945, the '''Imperial Japanese Navy''' was the branch of the Japanese military responsible for [[naval warfare]]. When the postwar Constitution renounced war, naval functions moved to the [[Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Agency]]. | From its beginning during the [[Meiji Restoration]] in 1869, to its [[World War II]] defeat in 1945, the '''Imperial Japanese Navy''' (''Nihon Kaigun'') was the branch of the Japanese military responsible for [[naval warfare]]. When the postwar Constitution renounced war, naval functions moved to the [[Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Agency]]. | ||
==Policy== | ==Policy== | ||
Revision as of 17:28, 3 June 2010
From its beginning during the Meiji Restoration in 1869, to its World War II defeat in 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) was the branch of the Japanese military responsible for naval warfare. When the postwar Constitution renounced war, naval functions moved to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Agency.
Policy
Both the Army and Navy took an active part in driving foreign policy, with the only check on them being the attitudes of Emperor Hirohito. The Navy opposed the 1930 London Naval Treaty, but Hirohito had his chief aide, Tajeki Nara pressure Fleet Admiral Togo into agreeing to the treaty, and his Grand Chamberlain, Kantaro Suzuki, pressure the Naval General Staff.[1]
The Cabinet Law (Japan) gave the Army and Navy a de facto veto over any Japanese government, since it required that the Army and Navy present candidate Army and Navy Minister from the list of serving officers. If a service declined to name a candidate, no Prime Minister could form a government.
Operations
While competition between armies and navies was common in many nations, there was unusual separation, despite the existence of Imperial General Headquarters (Japan), between the Japanese Army and Navy. Again as with other countries, there was a Navy Ministry with administrative responsibility and a Naval General Staff headed by the senior professional Chief of Naval General Staff. Below the Chief of Staff was the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, who had operational but not policy responsibility. For example, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had been Navy Vice-Minister during the policy discussions about starting the Second World War. He was transferred to Combined Fleet, in part, because there was a credible assassination threat to him from pro-war zealots, and, since the CinC's headquarters was on a battleship, he could be better protected.[2]
Doctrine
Japanese doctrine emphasized great, decisive surface battles in the model of Alfred Thayer Mahan. While they started WWII with extremely competent naval aviation, much of the leadership still believed the battleship supreme. A critical error was that the Navy did not institute a pilot rotation system, so there was no supply of rested veterans and new pilots they had taught.
References
- ↑ Herbert P. Bix (2000), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, p. 225
- ↑ Hiroyuki Agawa (1982), The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, Kodansha America, ISBN 978-0870115127