Scientific method: Difference between revisions
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*The Keystones of Science project, sponsored by the journal ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'', has selected a number of scientific articles from that journal and annotated them, illustrating how different parts of each article embody the scientific method. [http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/scope/keystone1/ Here] is an annotated example of the scientific method example. | *The Keystones of Science project, sponsored by the journal ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'', has selected a number of scientific articles from that journal and annotated them, illustrating how different parts of each article embody the scientific method. [http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/scope/keystone1/ Here] is an annotated example of the scientific method example. | ||
* [[Francis Bacon (philosopher)|Bacon, Francis]] ''Novum Organum (The New Organon)'', 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of [[Theory]], empirical results, data gathering, experiment, and independent corroboration. | * [[Francis Bacon (philosopher)|Bacon, Francis]] ''Novum Organum (The New Organon)'', 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of [[Theory]], empirical results, data gathering, experiment, and independent corroboration. | ||
* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1991) ''How We Think'', D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, [[Prometheus Books]], Buffalo, NY | * [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1991) ''How We Think'', D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, [[Prometheus Books]], Buffalo, NY | ||
* [[Werner Heisenberg|Heisenberg, Werner]] (1971) ''Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations'', A.J. Pomerans (trans.), Harper and Row, New York, NY pp.63–64 | * [[Werner Heisenberg|Heisenberg, Werner]] (1971) ''Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations'', A.J. Pomerans (trans.), Harper and Row, New York, NY pp.63–64 | ||
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* [[William McComas|McComas WF]], ed. [http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/science-edu/Myths%20of%20Science.pdf The Principle Elements of the Nature of Science: Dispelling the Myths], from ''The Nature of Science in Science Education'', pp53-70, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. | * [[William McComas|McComas WF]], ed. [http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/science-edu/Myths%20of%20Science.pdf The Principle Elements of the Nature of Science: Dispelling the Myths], from ''The Nature of Science in Science Education'', pp53-70, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. | ||
* [[Henri Poincaré|Poincaré H]] (1905) ''Science and Hypothesis'' [http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Poincare/Poincare_1905_toc.html Eprint] | * [[Henri Poincaré|Poincaré H]] (1905) ''Science and Hypothesis'' [http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Poincare/Poincare_1905_toc.html Eprint] | ||
==External links== | ==External links== |
Revision as of 07:34, 26 December 2006
The scientific method is how scientists investigate phenomena and acquire new knowledge. It is based on observable, empirical, measurable evidence. Scientists propose hypotheses to explain phenomena, and formulat. theories that encompass whole domains of inquiry and bind hypotheses together into logically coherent wholes. They design experimental studies to elaborate theories and test hypotheses.
"Science is a way of thinking much more than it is a body of knowledge." (Carl Sagan[1]).
Elements of scientific method
According to Charles Darwin ,
- ". . .science consists in grouping facts so that general laws or conclusions may be drawn from them."
This simple account begs many fundamental questions. What do we mean by ‘facts’? How much can we trust our senses to enable us to believe that what we see is true? How exactly do scientists ‘group’ facts? How do they select which facts to pay attention to, and is it even possible to do this in an objective way? And having done this, how exactly do they go about drawing any broader conclusions from the facts that they assemble? How can we know ‘’more’’ than we observe directly?
We live in a world that is not directly understandable. We sometimes disagree about the ‘facts’ we see around us, and some things in the world are at odds with our understanding. What we call the “scientific method” is an account of how scientists attempt to reach agreement and understanding, to provide explanations that will be consistent with the world and will withstand critical logical and experimental scrutiny. A "perfect" scientific method might work in such a way that its rational application would always result in agreement and understanding; a perfect method would arguably be algorithmic, and not leave any room for rational agents to disagree. Logical Positivist, empiricist, falsificationist, and other theories have claimed to give a definitive account of the logic of science, but each has been criticised.
The success of science, as measured by the technological achievements that have progressively changed our world, have led many to the conclusion that this must reflect the success of rules that scientists follow in their research. However, not all philosophers accept this conclusion; notably, the philosopher Paul Feyerabend denied that science is genuinely a methodological process. In his book Against Method he argued that scientific progress is not the result of applying any particular rules. Instead, he concluded almost that "anything goes", in that for any particular ‘rule’ there are abundant examples of successful science that have proceeded in a way that seems to contradict it. [2] To Feyeraband, there is no fundamental difference between science and other areas of human activity characterised by reasoned thought. A similar sentiment was expressed by T.H. Huxley in 1863: “The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the expression of the necessary mode or working of the human mind. It is simply the mode at which all phenomena are reasoned about, rendered precise and exact.” Nevertheless, in the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [509 U.S. 579 (1993)] decision, the U.S. Supreme Court accorded a legal status to ‘The Scientific Method ‘, in ruling that “… in order to qualify as ’scientific knowledge’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation - i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” The Court also stated that “A new theory or explanation must generally survive a period of testing, review, and refinement before achieving scientific acceptance. This process does not merely reflect the scientific method, it is the scientific method.”
Hypotheses and theories
Hypotheses and theories play a central role in science; the idea that any observer can study the world except through the spectacles of his or her preconceptions and expectations is not sustainable. As these preconceptions change with progressively changing understanding of the world, the nature of science itself changes, and what was once considered conventionally scientific no longer seems so in retrospect.
A hypothesis is a proposed explanation of a phenomenon. It is an “inspired guess”, a “bold speculation” , embedded in current understanding yet going beyond that to assert something that we do not know for sure as a way of explaining something not otherwise accounted for. Scientists use many different means to generate hypotheses including their own creative imagination, ideas from other fields, induction, Bayesian inference. Charles Sanders Peirce described the incipient stages of inquiry, instigated by the "irritation of doubt" to venture a plausible guess, as abductive reasoning. The history of science is filled with stories of scientists claiming a "flash of inspiration", or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to support or refute their idea. Michael Polanyi made such creativity the centrepiece of his discussion of methodology.
The philosopher Karl Popper , in a book that Sir Peter Medawar called one of the most important documents of the 20th century, argued forcefully that argued that
He argued that the essential quality of a good hypothesis is that it must be falsifiable; it must be challengeable by experiments, and he argued that science is this process of challenging hypotheses by experiments, and that progress is made when a hypothesis resists determined attempts at disproof, and becomes provisionally accepted as a valuable tool for adding to our understanding. Conversely, he argued that a proposition or theory cannot be called scientific if it does not admit the possibility of being shown false. It must, at least in principle, be possible to make an observation that would show the proposition to be false, otherwise the proposition is vacuous, with, as Popper put it, no connection with the real world. For Popper therefore, explanations without any predictive content, and he argued that the explanations of Freudian psychoanalysis, those of Marxism, and those of astrology, were all examples of ‘empty’ unscientific theories.
For Popper, a theory was the context within which hypotheses are developed, and which determined which things were important to investigate and which were not. The theory encompasses the preconceptions by which the world is viewed, and defines the ways we study it and understand it. A theory thus has a profound importance, without a theory no science is possible. He thus recognised that you do not discard a theory lightly, and that a theory might be inconsistent with many known facts (anomalies). However, the recognition of anomalies drives scientists to elaborate or adjust the theory, and if the anomalies continue to accumulate, will drive them to develop alternative theories. He also explained that theories always contain many elements that are not falsifiable, but he argued that these should be kept to a minimum, and that the content of a theory should be judged by the extent to which it inspired testable hypotheses (although this is certainly not his only criterion). Scientists also seek theories that are "elegant" or "beautiful"; these terms are subjective and hard to define, but they express the scientists expectation that a theory should yield clear, simple explanations of complex phenomena, that are intellectually satisfying in the sense of appearing to be logically coherent, rich in content, and involving no miracles or other supernatural devices.
Popper thus argued that progress in science depends upon attempted falsification of hypotheses, and that most progress came by success in falsifying them; disproof is logically sound, support by induction is logically unsound. "Verifiability" in Popper's view was not the object or intent of science, just a weak by-product of a failed attempt at falsification.
The historian of science Thomas Kuhn maintains that the "route from theory to measurement can almost never be travelled backward"; which theory is tested is dictated by the nature of the theory itself. This led Kuhn to argue that "once it has been adopted by a profession ... no theory is recognized to be testable by any quantitative tests that it has not already passed".[3]
Experiments and observations
Werner Heisenberg in a quote that he attributed to Albert Einstein , stated [Heisenberg 1971]:
- The phenomenon under observation produces certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in the apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce sense impressions and help us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along this whole path—from the phenomenon to its fixation in our consciousness—we must be able to tell how nature functions, must know the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to have observed anything at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables us to deduce the underlying phenomena from our sense impressions.
For a large part of the 20th century, the dominant approach to science has been reductionism – the attempt to explain all phenomena in terms of basic laws of physics and chemistry. In many fields, such explanations are very remote, and all explanations involve “high level” concepts, but the reductionist belief has been that these high level concepts are all ultimately reducible to physics and chemistry, and that the role of science is to progressively explain high level concepts by concepts closer and closer to the basic physics and chemistry. For example, to explain the behaviour of individuals we might refer to motivational states such as hunger or stress or anxiety. We believe that these reflect features of the activity of the brain that are still poorly understood, but can investigate the brain areas that house these motivational drives, calling them, for example, “hunger centres”, These centres each involve many neural networks – interconnected nerve cells, and the functions of each network we can again probe in more detail. These networks in turn are composed of specialised neurones, whose behaviour can be analysed individually. These specialised nerve cells have distinctive properties that are the product of a genetic program that is activated in development – and so reducible to molecular biology. However, while behaviour is in this sense reducible to basic elements, explanations in terms of these basic elements have at present little predictive value in general, because the uncertainties in our understanding are too great, so explanations of behaviour still largely depend upon the high level constructs. Historically, the converse philosophical position to reductionism has taken many names, but the clearest debate was between “vitalism” and reductionism. Vitalism held essentially that some features of living organisms, including life itself, were not amenable to a physico-chemical explanation, and so asserted that high level constructs were essential to understanding and explanation. Scientific measurements are usually tabulated, graphed, or mapped, and statistical analyses of them; often these representations of the data using tools and conventions that are at a given time, accepted and understood by scientists working within a given field. The measurements often require specialized instruments such as thermometers, microscopes, or voltmeters, whose properties and limitations are familiar to others in the field, and the progress of a scientific field is usually intimately tied to their development. Measurements also demand the use of operational definitions. A scientific quantity is defined precisely by how it is measured, in terms that enable other scientists to reproduce the measurements. In many cases, this ultimately involves internationally agreed ‘standards’. For example, electrical current, measured in amperes, can be defined in terms of the mass of silver deposited in a certain time on an electrode in an electrochemical device that is described in some detail. The scientific definition of a term sometimes differs substantially from their natural language usage. For example, mass and weight overlap in meaning in common use, but have different meanings in physics. Scientific quantities are often characterized by their units of measure which can later be described in terms of conventional physical units when communicating the work. Measurements are not reports of absolute truth, all measurements are accompanied by the possibility of error in measurement, so they are usually accompanied by estimates of their uncertainty, This is often estimated by making repeated measurements, and seeing by how much these differ. Counts of things, such as the number of people in a nation at a particular time, may also have an uncertainty due to limitations of the method used. Counts may only represent a sample of desired quantities, with an uncertainty that depends upon the sampling method used and the number of samples taken.
The scientific method in practice
The UK Research Charity Cancer UK gave an outline of the scientific method, as practised by their scientists [2]. The quotes that follow are all from this outline
‘’[Scientists] start by making an educated guess about what they think the answer might be, based on all the available evidence they have. This is known as forming an hypothesis. They then try to prove if their hypothesis is right or wrong. Researchers carry out carefully designed studies, often known as experiments, to test their hypothesis. They collect and record detailed information from the studies. They look carefully at the results to work out if their hypothesis is right or wrong…’’
Once predictions are made, they can be tested by experiments. If the outcome contradicts the predictions, then the hypotheses are called into question and explanations may be sought. Sometimes experiments are conducted incorrectly. If the results confirm the predictions, then the hypotheses are considered likely to be correct but might still be wrong and are subject to further testing. Scientists assume an attitude of openness and accountability on the part of those conducting an experiment. Detailed record keeping is essential, to provide evidence of the effectiveness and integrity of the procedure and to also assist in reproducing the experimental results. This tradition can be seen in the work of Hipparchus (190 BCE - 120 BCE), when determining a value for the precession of the Earth over 2100 years ago, and 1000 years before Al-Batani.
Peer review
‘’…Once they have completed their study, the researchers write up their results and conclusions. And they try to publish them as a paper in a scientific journal. Before the work can be published, it must be checked by a number of independent researchers who are experts in a relevant field. This process is called ‘peer review’, and involves scrutinising the research to see if there are any flaws that invalidate the results…’’
Manuscripts submitted for publication in scientific journals are normally sent by the editor to (usually one to three) fellow (usually anonymous) scientists who are familiar with the field for evaluation. The referees may or may not recommend publication, publication with suggested modifications, or, sometimes, publication in another journal. This helps to keep the scientific literature free of unscientific work, reduces obvious errors, and generally otherwise improve the quality of the scientific literature. The peer review process has been criticised, but has been very widely adopted by the scientific community.
Originality, importance and interest are particularly important in “high impact” journals - see for example the author guidelines for Nature. Criticisms (see Critical theory) of these restraints are that they are so nebulous in definition (e.g. "good scientific practice") and open to ideological, or even political, manipulation that they often serve to censor rather than promote scientific discovery. Apparent censorship through refusal to publish ideas unpopular with mainstream scientists (unpopular because of ideological reasons and/or because they seem to contradict long held scientific theories) has soured the popular perception of scientists as being neutral or seekers of truth and often denigrated popular perception of science.
The scientific literature
‘’…If the study is found to be good enough, the findings are published and acknowledged by the wider scientific community…’’
However Thomas Kuhn argued that scientists are
Sir Peter Medawar, Nobel laureate in Physiology and Medicinein his article “Is the scientific paper a fraud?” answered yes, “The scientific paper in its orthodox form does embody a totally mistaken conception, even a travesty, of the nature of scientific thought.” In scientific papers, the results of an experiment are interpreted only at the end, in the discussion section, giving the impression that those conclusions are drawn by induction or deduction from the reported evidence. Instead, explains Medawar, the expectations that a scientist begins with provide the incentive for the experiments, and determine their nature, and they determine which observations are relevant and which are not. Only in the light of these initial expectations that the activities described in a paper have any meaning at all. The expectation, the original hypothesis, according to Medawar, is not the product of inductive reasoning but of inspiration, educated guesswork. Medawar was echoing Karl Popper, who proclaimed that
Confirmation
‘’…But, it isn’t enough to prove a hypothesis once. Other researchers must also be able to repeat the study and produce the same results, if the hypothesis is to remain valid…’’
Sometimes experimenters make systematic errors during their experiments, Consequently, it is a common practice for other scientists to attempt to repeat experiments, especially experiments that have yielded unexpected results[4]. Accordingly, scientists keep detailed records of their experiments, to provide evidence of their effectiveness and integrity and assist in reproduction. However, it is not possible for a scientist to record everything that took place in an experiment. He must select the facts that he believes are relevant to the experiment. This may lead to problems if some supposedly irrelevant feature is questioned. For example, Heinrich Hertz did not report the size of the room that he used to test Maxwell's equations, and this turned out to account for a deviation in the results. The problem is that parts of the theory must be assumed in order to select and report the experimental conditions. Observations are thus sometimes described as being 'theory-laden'. It seems to be only very rarely that scientists falsify their results; any scientist who does so takes an enormous risk, because if the claim is important it is likely to be subjected to very detailed scrutiny, and the reputation of a scientist depends upon the credibility of his or her work. Nevertheless there have been many well publicised examples of scientific fraud, and some have blamed the insecurity of employment of scientists and the extreme pressure to win grant funding for these instances. Under Federal regulations as published in the Federal Register, vol 65, no. 235, December 6, 2000 “A finding of research misconduct requires that: There be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant research community; and The misconduct be committed intentionally, or knowingly, or recklessly; and The allegation be proven by a preponderance of evidence.” Honor in Science, published by Sigma Xi , quotes C.P. Snow (The Search, 1959):“The only ethical principle which has made science possible is that the truth shall be told all the time. If we do not penalise false statements made in error, we open up the way, don’t you see, for false statements by intention. And of course a false statement of fact, made deliberately, is the most serious crime a scientist can commit.” It goes on to say: “It is not sufficient for the scientist to admit that all human activity, including research, is liable to involve errors; he or she has a moral obligation to minimize the possibility of error by checking and rechecking the validity of the data and the conclusions that are drawn from the data.”
Statistics
‘’…If the initial study was carried out using a small number of samples or people, larger studies are also needed. This is to make sure the hypothesis remains valid for bigger group and isn't due to chance variation…’’
There is an important school of Bayesian statistics that seeks to provide a statistical basis for support by induction, and some areas of science use these approaches; but in much of science this approach is not tenable because of the difficulty of attaching a priori probabilities in any meaningful way to the alternative predicted outcomes of an experiment. Popper was a mathematical logician, and argued strongly against Bayesian approaches. Popper was interested in how "support" for a theory could be measures by quantifying the degree of corroborative support, he did not dismiss statistical approaches lightly and explored their utility in detail. But in appendix ix to The Logic he states: As to degree of corroboration, it is nothing but a measure of the degree to which hypothesis h has been tested...it must not be interpreted therefore as a degree of the rationality of our belief in the truth of h...rather it is a measure of the rationality of accepting, tentatively, a problematic guess
Progress in science
‘’…Over time, scientific opinion can change. This is because new technologies can allow us to re-examine old questions in greater detail.’’
General Relativity
Einstein's theory of General Relativity makes several specific predictions about the observable structure of space-time, such as a prediction that light bends in a gravitational field and that the amount of bending depends in a precise way on the strength of that gravitational field. Arthur Eddington's observations made during a 1919 solar eclipse supported General Relativity rather than Newtonian gravitation.
See Also
Models of scientific inquiry Pseudoscience
Notes and references
- ↑ Sagan C. The fine art of baloney detection. Parade Magazine, p 1213, Feb 1, 1987.
- ↑ Feyerabend PK (1975) Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge Reprinted, Verso, London, UK, 1978
- ↑
Kuhn TS (1961) The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science ISIS 52:161–193
- Kuhn TS (1962)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1962. 2nd edition 1970. 3rd edition 1996.
- Kuhn TS (1977) The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
- ↑ Georg Wilhelm Richmann was killed by lightning (1753) when attempting to replicate the 1752 kite experiment of Benjamin Franklin. See, e.g., Physics Today, Vol. 59, #1, p42. [1]
Further reading
- The Keystones of Science project, sponsored by the journal Science, has selected a number of scientific articles from that journal and annotated them, illustrating how different parts of each article embody the scientific method. Here is an annotated example of the scientific method example.
- Bacon, Francis Novum Organum (The New Organon), 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of Theory, empirical results, data gathering, experiment, and independent corroboration.
- Dewey, John (1991) How We Think, D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY
- Heisenberg, Werner (1971) Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations, A.J. Pomerans (trans.), Harper and Row, New York, NY pp.63–64
- Latour, Bruno, Science in Action, How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
- McComas WF, ed. The Principle Elements of the Nature of Science: Dispelling the Myths, from The Nature of Science in Science Education, pp53-70, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998.
- Poincaré H (1905) Science and Hypothesis Eprint
External links
Science treatments
- An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and a scientific method by Steven D. Schafersman.
- Introduction to a scientific method
- Theory-ladenness by Paul Newall at The Galilean Library
- Scientific Method
- Analysis and Synthesis: On Scientific Method based on a study by Bernhard Riemann From the Swedish Morphological Society
- Using the scientific method for designing science fair projects from Science Made Simple
Alternative scientific treatments
- The Myth of a scientific method by Dr. Terry Halwes (A respectful essay making the point that scientists actually use a variety of methods that cannot be easily reduced to a single coherent methodology.)
- The Test Case As A Scientific Experiment (An article that compares the scientific method and software testing)
- The Scientific Principle - a simplistic overview