Talk:Intelligence (disambiguation): Difference between revisions
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imported>Chris Day |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (The challenge in management is balancing protecting sources & methods against getting actionable information to people who need it.) |
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<s>Currently, the only subset of '''Intelligence cycle management''' is '''Intelligence collection management'''. Shouldn't these be combined into one heading? Or is there more to come?</s> Forget that last comment, I missread the hierarchy [[User:Chris Day|Chris Day]] 11:10, 1 May 2008 (CDT) | <s>Currently, the only subset of '''Intelligence cycle management''' is '''Intelligence collection management'''. Shouldn't these be combined into one heading? Or is there more to come?</s> Forget that last comment, I missread the hierarchy [[User:Chris Day|Chris Day]] 11:10, 1 May 2008 (CDT) | ||
:I'm no expert here but is ''Intelligence cycle security'' really a subset of ''Intelligence cycle management''? Or should they both be at the same level? | :I'm no expert here but is ''Intelligence cycle security'' really a subset of ''Intelligence cycle management''? Or should they both be at the same level? | ||
::Good question. I intended to put security at a lower level than the management, because the top-level managers of intelligence constantly have to balance protecting sources with providing material to people who can use it. The classic example, although it has lots of nuances, is not providing enough information, or in a timely manner, about Japanese diplomatic activity to the field commanders at places such as Pearl Harbor. | |||
::Perhaps the things to think about balancing are security and dissemination. With the benefit of hindsight, there were pieces, especially in different FBI offices that didn't share information, that could have given at least partial warning of the 9/11 hijackings. Part of the problem was that no one was "connecting the dots" between field offices, and that while there were interagency counterterror organizations, there was information not shared between the FBI and CIA. [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 11:56, 1 May 2008 (CDT) | |||
Revision as of 10:56, 1 May 2008
General term for national intelligence
Intelligence (espionage) doesn't work well, as espionage is a form of HUMINT. Here is a hierarchy that I developed at Wikipedia:
Intelligence cycle management
- Intelligence collection management
- SIGINT
- Electro-optical MASINT
- Nuclear MASINT
- Geophysical MASINT
- Radar MASINT should true imaging radar move to IMINT?
- Radiofrequency MASINT
- Materials MASINT
- HUMINT
- Clandestine HUMINT strong tie-in with counterintelligence
- Special reconnaissance also a special operations technique
- Special reconnaissance organizations
- Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques
- Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting
- Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action (also see Direct action (military))
- Clandestine cell system
- OSINT$
- TECHINT$ (the article exists, but has expanded, not necessarily cleanly, into national-level scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) and economic intelligence. With the latter two, as with TECHINT, the problem is that they have aspects of both collection and analysis. I think they are more analysis, but haven't decided a good way to describe their collection requirements
- medical intelligence (if it doesn't go under intelligence organizations) As for TECHINT, there are collection and analysis aspects.
- IMINT$
- Should imaging radar move here, but not, for example, tracking radar used to determine missile performance? Anything from electro-optical MASINT? My basic rule: IMINT forms pictures, quasi-imaging MASINT gives graphs or property-by-pixel tables'
- SIGINT
- Intelligence analysis management
- Intelligence analysis
- Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis
- US intelligence community A-Space
- financial intelligence
- economic intelligence
- medical intelligence
- Intelligence analysis
- Intelligence dissemination management
- Intelligence cycle security
- Counterintelligence
- Counterintelligence failures*
- Counter-intelligence and counterterror organizations
- Counterintelligence
Discussion of hierarchy
Currently, the only subset of Intelligence cycle management is Intelligence collection management. Shouldn't these be combined into one heading? Or is there more to come? Forget that last comment, I missread the hierarchy Chris Day 11:10, 1 May 2008 (CDT)
- I'm no expert here but is Intelligence cycle security really a subset of Intelligence cycle management? Or should they both be at the same level?
- Good question. I intended to put security at a lower level than the management, because the top-level managers of intelligence constantly have to balance protecting sources with providing material to people who can use it. The classic example, although it has lots of nuances, is not providing enough information, or in a timely manner, about Japanese diplomatic activity to the field commanders at places such as Pearl Harbor.
- Perhaps the things to think about balancing are security and dissemination. With the benefit of hindsight, there were pieces, especially in different FBI offices that didn't share information, that could have given at least partial warning of the 9/11 hijackings. Part of the problem was that no one was "connecting the dots" between field offices, and that while there were interagency counterterror organizations, there was information not shared between the FBI and CIA. Howard C. Berkowitz 11:56, 1 May 2008 (CDT)