Ontology (philosophy): Difference between revisions
imported>John R. Brews (→References: typo) |
imported>John R. Brews (bacon; tropes) |
||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | ||
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> Another large arena for discussion is the existence of ''properties'' and other ''universals'' that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one.<ref name= | For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> Another large arena for discussion is the existence of ''properties'' and other ''universals'' that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one,<ref name=Swoyer/> and their distinction from instances (tropes).<ref name=Bacon/> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|refs= | {{reflist|refs= | ||
<ref name=Bacon> | |||
{{cite web |author=Bacon, John |title=Tropes |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/tropes/ |date=Feb 27, 2008}} | |||
</ref> | |||
<ref name=Hirsch> | <ref name=Hirsch> | ||
Revision as of 11:53, 19 July 2013
In philosophy the field of ontology considers what things exist, and what existence implies.[1]
For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the usage of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.[2] Such phrases are called quantifier expressions.[3]
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of mereology. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?[4] Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about something?[5] Another large arena for discussion is the existence of properties and other universals that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one,[6] and their distinction from instances (tropes).[7]
References
- ↑ Tony Lawson (December, 2004). A concept of ontology. Retrieved on 2013-07-19.
- ↑ Eli Hirsch (2011). “Introduction”, Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University Press, p. xii. ISBN 0199732116.
- ↑ Dag Westerståhl (April 19, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Generalized Quantifiers. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition).
- ↑ Hilary Putnam (1987). The Many Faces of Realism, 2nd. Open Court, p. 33. ISBN 0812690427.
- ↑ Alex Orenstein, Petr Kotatko (2001). “Plato's beard and Quine's stubble”, Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Springer, p. 210. ISBN 140200253X.
- ↑ Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco (September 12, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Properties. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).
- ↑ Bacon, John (Feb 27, 2008). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Tropes. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).