Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Difference between revisions

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'''Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission''' is a controversial 2010  [[Supreme Court of the United States]] decision<ref>(130 S. Ct. 876)</ref> that [[First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution]] rights applied to [[corporations as well as biological persons, reversing laws that restricted corporate contributions to political campaigns.  It is a victory for the [[corporate rights movement]], a broader initiative to extend the originally narrow definition of a corporation as a legal person, to an entity that has the rights of biological people.
'''Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission''' is a controversial 2010  [[Supreme Court of the United States]] decision<ref>(130 S. Ct. 876)</ref> that [[First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution]] rights applied to [[corporation]]s as well as biological persons, reversing laws that restricted corporate contributions to political campaigns.  It is a victory for the [[corporate rights movement]], a broader initiative to extend the originally narrow definition of a corporation as a legal person, to an entity that has the rights of biological people. The Court decided a matter that began with the request for injunctive relief by [[Citizens United]], a [[501(c)(4)]] nonprofit corporation , against the [[Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act]] of 2002 (BCRA or McCain-Feingold), as administered by the [[Federal Elections Commission]], which  prohibits corporations and unions from using their [[general treasury fund]]s to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech thatexpressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, orsatellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidatefor Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election,<ref>§434(f)(3)(A)</ref>, and that is “publicly distributed,” <ref>11 CFR §100.29(a)(2)</ref>,which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or morepersons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish a [[political action committee]] (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneer-ing communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In [[McConnell
 
The case being appealed was a challenge by [[Citizens United]] to the [[Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act]] of 2002 (BCRA or McCain-Feingold), as administered by the [[Federal Elections Commission]], which  prohibits corporations and unions from usingtheir [[general treasury fund]]s to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech thatexpressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, orsatellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidatefor Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election,<ref>§434(f)(3)(A)</ref>, and that is “publicly distributed,” <ref>11 CFR §100.29(a)(2)</ref>,which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or morepersons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish a [[political action committee]] (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneer-ing communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In [[McConnell
v. Federal Elections Commission]] <ref>540 U. S. 93, 203–209</ref>, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the precedent  in [[Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce]], <ref> 494 U.S. 652</ref> that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
v. Federal Elections Commission]] <ref>540 U. S. 93, 203–209</ref>, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the precedent  in [[Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce]], <ref> 494 U.S. 652</ref> that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.



Revision as of 16:17, 10 October 2010

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Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission is a controversial 2010 Supreme Court of the United States decision[1] that First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution rights applied to corporations as well as biological persons, reversing laws that restricted corporate contributions to political campaigns. It is a victory for the corporate rights movement, a broader initiative to extend the originally narrow definition of a corporation as a legal person, to an entity that has the rights of biological people. The Court decided a matter that began with the request for injunctive relief by Citizens United, a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation , against the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or McCain-Feingold), as administered by the Federal Elections Commission, which prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech thatexpressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, orsatellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidatefor Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election,[2], and that is “publicly distributed,” [3],which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or morepersons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish a political action committee (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneer-ing communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In [[McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission]] [4], this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the precedent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, [5] that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.

In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary (hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party’s Presidential nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television the through video-on-demand within 30 days of primary elections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating §441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive re-lief, arguing that

  • (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary;
  • (2) BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements,BCRA §§201 and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads.

The District Court denied Citizens United a preliminary injunction and granted appellee Federal Election Commission(FEC) summary judgment.

The Decisions

Decided by a 5-4 vote, the majority opinion was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor.

Parties to the Case

Impacts

Legal

Political tactics

Philosophical

Developments

References

  1. (130 S. Ct. 876)
  2. §434(f)(3)(A)
  3. 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2)
  4. 540 U. S. 93, 203–209
  5. 494 U.S. 652