Gulf War (Iraq, 1991)/Iraqi OOB: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: {{subpages}} ==Special Republican Guard== Saddam's final military defense, of approximately 15,000 men. Never left Baghdad. ==Republican Guard== LTG Ayad Futatih al-Rawi, commanding. <ref ...) |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz mNo edit summary |
||
| Line 26: | Line 26: | ||
| first = Robert H. Jr | last = Scales | | first = Robert H. Jr | last = Scales | ||
| title = Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War | | title = Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War | ||
| publisher = Brassey's | year = 1994 | | publisher = Brassey's | year = 1994}} p.67 </ref> | ||
III Corps was in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) and apparently served as the planning, if not control, headquarters for the attack on Khafji. | III Corps was in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) and apparently served as the planning, if not control, headquarters for the attack on Khafji. | ||
Revision as of 14:52, 29 July 2008
Special Republican Guard
Saddam's final military defense, of approximately 15,000 men. Never left Baghdad.
Republican Guard
LTG Ayad Futatih al-Rawi, commanding. [1] There appear to have been two corps headquarters.
- Abed Infantry Division
- Adnan Mechanized Division
- Baghdad Infantry Division
- Hammurabi Mechanized Division.
- Medina Armoured Division, also called Medina Luminous
- Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division
Three brigades were designated "Special Forces", but, in the Western sense, these were heliborne air assault units.
Regular Army
While the main army units were inferior to the Republican Guard, there was a distinct difference in quality between the "regular" armored and mechanized divisions, and the "conscript" infantry divisions.
After Kuwait was taken, the Republican Guard moved back to theater reserve duty. Ten conscript infantry divisions guarded the Saudi border and the coast, apparently organized as a large corps, with four heavy divisions in Corps reserve. [2]
III Corps was in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) and apparently served as the planning, if not control, headquarters for the attack on Khafji.
References
- ↑ Keegan, John (June 28, 2004), "The American Triumph", National Review Online
- ↑ Scales, Robert H. Jr (1994), Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Brassey's p.67