Welfare economics/Tutorials: Difference between revisions
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<ref>[http://www.econlib.org/Library/NPDBooks/Pigou/pgEW.html Arthur Pigou,: The Economics of Welfare Macmillan 1932 (first published: 1920)]</ref>. Pigou observed that a unit increase in income | <ref>[http://www.econlib.org/Library/NPDBooks/Pigou/pgEW.html Arthur Pigou,: The Economics of Welfare Macmillan 1932 (first published: 1920)]</ref>. Pigou observed that a unit increase in income | ||
adds more to the welfare of poor man than it adds to that of a rich man, and concluded that social welfare would be increased by a transfer from the rich to the poor. The first dissent came in 1938 from Lionel Robbins, who argued that Pigou's analysis was faulty because it required interpersonal comparisons of welfare<ref> Lionel Robbins: "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", ''Economic Journal'' December 1938</ref>, and urged a return to the "unanimity rule" which had been proposed by Vilfredo Pareto - which stated that it could not be assumed that welfare would increase unless there would be some gainers and no losers | adds more to the welfare of poor man than it adds to that of a rich man, and concluded that social welfare would be increased by a transfer from the rich to the poor. The first dissent came in 1938 from Lionel Robbins, who argued that Pigou's analysis was faulty because it required interpersonal comparisons of welfare<ref> Lionel Robbins: "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", ''Economic Journal'' December 1938</ref>, and urged a return to the "unanimity rule" which had been proposed by Vilfredo Pareto - which stated that it could not be assumed that welfare would increase unless there would be some gainers and no losers | ||
<ref> Vilfredo Pareto: ''Manual d’Economic Politique'', Manuel Giard 1927</ref> - along with the associated concept of Pareto-efficiency. That was followed in 1939 by a proposal by Nicholas Kaldor to escape the interpersonal comparison problem by adopting a "compensation principle" under which a change would be deemed to increase efficiency if it could increase the welfare of its gainers after they had compensated the losers <ref> Nicholas Kaldor "Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare" ''Economic Journal 49 1939</ref> | <ref> Vilfredo Pareto: ''Manual d’Economic Politique'', Manuel Giard 1927</ref> - along with the associated concept of Pareto-efficiency. That was followed in 1939 by a proposal by Nicholas Kaldor to escape the interpersonal comparison problem by adopting a "compensation principle" under which a change would be deemed to increase efficiency if it could increase the welfare of its gainers after they had compensated the losers <ref> Nicholas Kaldor "Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare" ''Economic Journal 49 1939</ref>. That proposal was endorsed by Sir John Hicks <ref> John Hicks: "The Foundations of Welfare Economics", ''Economic Journal'' September 1939</ref>, and became known as the the "Kaldor-Hicks criterion", but it was widely rejected by other economists as implying an ability to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. (The claim that such comparisons could be avoided if the compensation was actually the paid, encountered objections arising from the formidable difficulties of determining the correct payments). An elaboration of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion known as the Scitovsky criterion was open to similar objections. | ||
The next development was the Arrow-Debreu proof that, on the assumptions noted in the article | The next development was the Arrow-Debreu proof that, (on the assumptions noted in the main article) an interacting system of markets could reach an equilibrium in which all markets clear simultaneously <ref>Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu: "The Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy", ''Econometrica'', vol. XXII 1954 </ref> (known as the "existence theorem" and referred to in some texts as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics) and the publication of the two theorems set out in the main article <ref> Kenneth Arrow: "An Extension of the Basic Theorem of Classical Welfare Economics", '' Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Seminar on Mathematical Statistics and Probability'' University of California Press 1951</ref>. Arrow went | ||
on to examine the possibility that a ranking of a community's preferences could be arrived at democratically, and his conclusion was his "impossibilty theorem" which demonstrated that no acceptable voting system could be devised which guaranteed a ranking consistent with the preferences of its members <ref> Kenneth Arrow: "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", ''Journal of Political Economy'' 58(4) August, 1950</ref>. | on to examine the possibility that a ranking of a community's preferences could be arrived at democratically, and his conclusion was his "impossibilty theorem" which demonstrated that no acceptable voting system could be devised which guaranteed a ranking consistent with the preferences of its members <ref> Kenneth Arrow: "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", ''Journal of Political Economy'' 58(4) August, 1950</ref>. | ||
Revision as of 08:07, 19 April 2008
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The social welfare controversy
The controversy among economists concerning the concept of the welfare of a community (or "social welfare") is not dwelt upon in the main article because it has had little effect upon the practice of economics. Nevertheless it should be of interest to philosophers and students of economics.
The debate started in the 1920s with the publication of Pigou's "Economics of Welfare" [1]. Pigou observed that a unit increase in income adds more to the welfare of poor man than it adds to that of a rich man, and concluded that social welfare would be increased by a transfer from the rich to the poor. The first dissent came in 1938 from Lionel Robbins, who argued that Pigou's analysis was faulty because it required interpersonal comparisons of welfare[2], and urged a return to the "unanimity rule" which had been proposed by Vilfredo Pareto - which stated that it could not be assumed that welfare would increase unless there would be some gainers and no losers [3] - along with the associated concept of Pareto-efficiency. That was followed in 1939 by a proposal by Nicholas Kaldor to escape the interpersonal comparison problem by adopting a "compensation principle" under which a change would be deemed to increase efficiency if it could increase the welfare of its gainers after they had compensated the losers [4]. That proposal was endorsed by Sir John Hicks [5], and became known as the the "Kaldor-Hicks criterion", but it was widely rejected by other economists as implying an ability to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. (The claim that such comparisons could be avoided if the compensation was actually the paid, encountered objections arising from the formidable difficulties of determining the correct payments). An elaboration of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion known as the Scitovsky criterion was open to similar objections.
The next development was the Arrow-Debreu proof that, (on the assumptions noted in the main article) an interacting system of markets could reach an equilibrium in which all markets clear simultaneously [6] (known as the "existence theorem" and referred to in some texts as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics) and the publication of the two theorems set out in the main article [7]. Arrow went on to examine the possibility that a ranking of a community's preferences could be arrived at democratically, and his conclusion was his "impossibilty theorem" which demonstrated that no acceptable voting system could be devised which guaranteed a ranking consistent with the preferences of its members [8].
Normative economics?
References
- ↑ Arthur Pigou,: The Economics of Welfare Macmillan 1932 (first published: 1920)
- ↑ Lionel Robbins: "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", Economic Journal December 1938
- ↑ Vilfredo Pareto: Manual d’Economic Politique, Manuel Giard 1927
- ↑ Nicholas Kaldor "Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare" Economic Journal 49 1939
- ↑ John Hicks: "The Foundations of Welfare Economics", Economic Journal September 1939
- ↑ Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu: "The Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy", Econometrica, vol. XXII 1954
- ↑ Kenneth Arrow: "An Extension of the Basic Theorem of Classical Welfare Economics", Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Seminar on Mathematical Statistics and Probability University of California Press 1951
- ↑ Kenneth Arrow: "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", Journal of Political Economy 58(4) August, 1950
- ↑ Paul Samuelson: "The Empirical Implications of Utility Analysis" Econometrica October 1938
- ↑ Paul Samuelson: Foundations of Economic Analysis Harvard University Press 1947
- ↑ Amartya Sen: "Behaviour and the Concept of Preference" Economica August 1973
- ↑ Ian Little A critique of Welfare Economics Oxford Paperbacks 1960
- ↑ Colin Camerer and Ernst Fehr "When Does Economic Man Dominate Social Behaviour?" in Science 6th January 2006