Mexican-American War: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Richard Jensen
imported>Richard Jensen
(add text)
Line 6: Line 6:


===Perceptions of each side===
===Perceptions of each side===
===Inside the U.S.====
====Inside the U.S.====
====Along the border====
====Along the border====
Delay (2007) and Reséndez (2004) explain the American need to suppress Indian raids originating from Mexican territory.  During the 1830s and 1840s, northern Mexico experienced a terrifying increase in interethnic violence as Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and other Indians attacked Mexican settlements across nine states in northern Mexico. Raids claimed thousands of lives, ruined the ranching and mining industries, and forced most Hispanics to flee the border region.  Just as importantly, the violence shaped how Americans and Mexicans came to view each other in advance of the war. US observers saw Indians driving Mexicans backward, with the government there uninterested and incapable of defending the territory it had seized from Spain. With the Mexican army being used primarily to wage political battles for control of the government, [[Latinos|Hispanic residents]] of the affected areas despaired that their government would help them; they increasingly welcomed American intervention, which they correctly expected would end the Indian raids. Mexican politicians compained Washington was fomenting Indian raids in order to acquire territory.  
Delay (2007) and Reséndez (2004) explain the American need to suppress Indian raids originating from Mexican territory.  During the 1830s and 1840s, northern Mexico experienced a terrifying increase in interethnic violence as Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and other Indians attacked Mexican settlements across nine states in northern Mexico. Raids claimed thousands of lives, ruined the ranching and mining industries, and forced most Hispanics to flee the border region.  Just as importantly, the violence shaped how Americans and Mexicans came to view each other in advance of the war. US observers saw Indians driving Mexicans backward, with the government there uninterested and incapable of defending the territory it had seized from Spain. With the Mexican army being used primarily to wage political battles for control of the government, [[Latinos|Hispanic residents]] of the affected areas despaired that their government would help them; they increasingly welcomed American intervention, which they correctly expected would end the Indian raids. Mexican politicians compained Washington was fomenting Indian raids in order to acquire territory.  
Line 12: Line 12:
Meanwhile in New Mexico, the economy and society were becoming integated with the U.S. and nuevomexicanos were increasingly estranged from Mexico. Some Catholic priests tried to prevent full integration by restricting marriages between Protestant American men and Mexican Catholic women. By 1846 little fervor existed in New Mexico for resisting the American army.  Consequently the Mexican army did not attempt to defend New Mexico or California. Few [[Latinos|Hispanics]] after the war went to Mexico, as the great majority of tejanos, californios and nuevomexicanos preferred American rule..<ref> See Reséndez, ''Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850'' (2004) </ref>  
Meanwhile in New Mexico, the economy and society were becoming integated with the U.S. and nuevomexicanos were increasingly estranged from Mexico. Some Catholic priests tried to prevent full integration by restricting marriages between Protestant American men and Mexican Catholic women. By 1846 little fervor existed in New Mexico for resisting the American army.  Consequently the Mexican army did not attempt to defend New Mexico or California. Few [[Latinos|Hispanics]] after the war went to Mexico, as the great majority of tejanos, californios and nuevomexicanos preferred American rule..<ref> See Reséndez, ''Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850'' (2004) </ref>  
====In Mexico====
====In Mexico====
In Mexico itself Henderson (2007) emphasizes that Mexican agency in going to war reflected a profound sense of weakness. Mexico's revolutionary experience had produced a virulent factionalism based on divisions of race, class, region and ideology. The successful by Texas in 1836 only made it more clear that Mexico was too weak to populate, control and defend its northern territories, but that opinion was derided by Mexican politicians. Instead, they all denounced the policies of their rivals. The only common denominator was that Texas must be reconquered, even if that meant war with overwhelmingly superior U.S. military and economic power. But the Mexican people remained largely indifferent—otherwise Winfield Scott's landing at Vera Cruz and his decisive march on Mexico City would have been impossible. Mexico, unable to pursue a pragmatic strategy of negotiation and compromise, suffered—and celebrated—a "glorious defeat" that further unraveled a disunited nation.
In Mexico itself Henderson (2007) emphasizes that Mexican agency in going to war reflected a profound sense of weakness. Mexico's revolutionary experience had produced a virulent factionalism based on divisions of race, class, region and ideology. The successful by Texas in 1836 only made it more clear that Mexico was too weak to populate, control and defend its northern territories, but that opinion was derided by Mexican politicians. Instead, they all denounced the policies of their rivals. The only common denominator was that Texas must be reconquered, even if that meant war with overwhelmingly superior U.S. military and economic power.
 
In any case Mexico was in no position to negotiate with the U.S. because of its instability. In 1846 alone the presidency changed hands 4 times, the war minister changed 6 times, the finance minister changed 16 times. <ref>Donald Fithian Stevens, ''Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico'' (1991) p. 11 </ref> As one Mexican historian explains: <ref> Miguel E. Soto, "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" in ''Essays on the Mexican War'' ed by Wayne Cutler; Texas A&M University Press. 1986. pp 66-67</ref> 
:"Mexican public opinion and all the various political factions that aspired to or that actually shared in power at that time, had to—willingly or unwillingly—participate in a very hawkish attitude toward the war. Anyone who tried to avoid open conflict with the United States was treated as a traitor. That was precisely the case of President José Joaquin de Herrera. At one time he, at least, seriously considered receiving the American special envoy, John Slidell, in order to negotiate the problem of Texas annexation peacefully. But as soon as he assumed that position, the president was accused of favoring the handing over of a part of national territory; he was accused of treason and was overthrown."
 
Mexico was not a democratic country. The Mexican people as a whole remained largely indifferent—otherwise Winfield Scott's landing at Vera Cruz and his decisive march on Mexico City would have been impossible. Mexico, unable to pursue a pragmatic strategy of negotiation and compromise, suffered—and celebrated—a "glorious defeat" that further unraveled a disunited nation.


===Start of war===
===Start of war===
Shortly after the U.S. Congress by joint resolution annexed Texas in 1845, the Mexican government recalled its minister from Washington and broke off diplomatic relations. Government newspapers in Mexico City acted as if war already existed. On June 15, 1845, Brevet Brigadier General [[Zachary Taylor]], commanding American troops in the southwest, received orders to move forward into some disputed territory "on or near the Rio Grande." In August he encamped on the west bank of the Nueces River, Texas. President Polk then sent [[John Slidell]] of New Orleans to Mexico City with a proposal to adjust the boundary dispute, and to purchase Upper California and New Mexico.  
Shortly after the U.S. Congress by joint resolution annexed Texas in 1845, the Mexican government recalled its minister from Washington and broke off diplomatic relations. Government newspapers in Mexico City acted as if war already existed. On June 15, 1845, Brevet Brigadier General [[Zachary Taylor]], commanding American troops in the southwest, received orders to move forward into some disputed territory "on or near the Rio Grande." In August he encamped on the west bank of the Nueces River, Texas. President Polk then sent [[John Slidell]] of New Orleans to Mexico City with a proposal to adjust the boundary dispute, and to purchase Upper California and New Mexico. MExico rejected Slidell's mission, and rejected efforts by Britain to broker a compromise. It was time for war.


Mexico was in no position to negotiate with Slidell because of its instability. In 1846 alone the presidency changed hands 4 times, the war minister changed 6 times, the finance minister changed 16 times. <ref>Donald Fithian Stevens, ''Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico'' (1991) p. 11 </ref> As one Mexican historian explains: <ref> Miguel E. Soto, "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" in ''Essays on the Mexican War'' ed by Wayne Cutler; Texas A&M University Press. 1986. pp 66-67</ref> 
:"Mexican public opinion and all the various political factions that aspired to or that actually shared in power at that time, had to—willingly or unwillingly—participate in a very hawkish attitude toward the war. Anyone who tried to avoid open conflict with the United States was treated as a traitor. That was precisely the case of President José Joaquin de Herrera. At one time he, at least, seriously considered receiving the American special envoy, John Slidell, in order to negotiate the problem of Texas annexation peacefully. But as soon as he assumed that position, the president was accused of favoring the handing over of a part of national territory; he was accused of treason and was overthrown."


When the Mexican government refused to negotiate with Slidell, Polk on Jan. 3, 1846, instructed Taylor to advance. Within a month Taylor's forces were at the Rio Grande. On April 12 General Pedro Ampudia demanded that Taylor retreat beyond the Nueces. Taylor held his position, and on April 24 a Mexican force ambushed a party of American dragoons on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. Polk already had decided to recommend a declaration of war. On May 11 his message went to Congress. A war appropriation bill providing for enlistments passed both houses by overwhelming margins. Its preamble declared that the war existed by the act of Mexico.
When the Mexican government refused to negotiate with Slidell, Polk on Jan. 3, 1846, instructed Taylor to advance. Within a month Taylor's forces were at the Rio Grande. On April 12 General Pedro Ampudia demanded that Taylor retreat beyond the Nueces. Taylor held his position, and on April 24 a Mexican force ambushed a party of American dragoons on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. Polk already had decided to recommend a declaration of war. On May 11 his message went to Congress. A war appropriation bill providing for enlistments passed both houses by overwhelming margins. Its preamble declared that the war existed by the act of Mexico.
Line 36: Line 39:
As regimental commanders, volunteer colonels were vital to American military efforts, raising units of volunteer soldiers who agreed to serve outside US boundaries. The came from western states, especially Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi.  Of the 63 volunteer colonels on active duty in 1846, 14 belonged to the [[Whig Party]], indicating that Whigs were not monolithic in their opposition to the war. The colonels accumulated a mixed wartime record of leadership, and their backgrounds varied greatly. Some had no military experience prior to 1846, but others had graduated from West Point, served in the regular army, seen combat in war or on the frontier, or held rank in a state militia. The colonels also varied widely in holding political office before and after the war. Several of them were experienced politicians before 1846 who also held important offices after the war, showing that most colonels were recognized figures in their home states.<ref> Joseph G. Dawson IIII, "Leaders for Manifest Destiny: American Volunteer Colonels Serving in the U.S.-Mexican War." ''American Nineteenth Century History'' (2006) 7(2): 253-279. Issn: 1466-4658 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>
As regimental commanders, volunteer colonels were vital to American military efforts, raising units of volunteer soldiers who agreed to serve outside US boundaries. The came from western states, especially Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi.  Of the 63 volunteer colonels on active duty in 1846, 14 belonged to the [[Whig Party]], indicating that Whigs were not monolithic in their opposition to the war. The colonels accumulated a mixed wartime record of leadership, and their backgrounds varied greatly. Some had no military experience prior to 1846, but others had graduated from West Point, served in the regular army, seen combat in war or on the frontier, or held rank in a state militia. The colonels also varied widely in holding political office before and after the war. Several of them were experienced politicians before 1846 who also held important offices after the war, showing that most colonels were recognized figures in their home states.<ref> Joseph G. Dawson IIII, "Leaders for Manifest Destiny: American Volunteer Colonels Serving in the U.S.-Mexican War." ''American Nineteenth Century History'' (2006) 7(2): 253-279. Issn: 1466-4658 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>
===Antiwar sentiments===   
===Antiwar sentiments===   
Politically, the [[U.S. Democratic Party, history|Democratic party]] rallied behind Polk and strongly supported the war.  The [[Whig Party]] has opposed the annexation of Texas and generally opposed the war.  Some spponents (like Army lieutenany [[Ulysses S. Grant]]) believed the war constituted an unjust aggression against helpless Mexico. [[Henry Clay]] and many Whigs opposed geographical expansion because they wanted vertical modernization (based on industry and banking), rather than more-of-the-same farmland.  Antislavery elements in New England saw the war as a conspiracy by soputhern slave owners--called the [[Slave Power]]--to expand their holdings. (Historians after 1900 agreed that allegation was untrue.) Still other dissenters feared the war might undercut [[Republicanism, U.S.|republican values]] by transforming the United States from a republic to a grasping militaristic empire. Typical opponents used several different arguments, to no avail. 
[[Abraham Lincoln]] a new member of Congress from Illinois, was not a particularly powerful or influential figure, but he was articulate in denouncing the war, which he attributed to Polk's desire for "military glory — that attractive rainbow, that rises in showers of blood." He also challenged the President's claims regarding the Texas boundary and offered a resoltuion (which did not pass) demanding to know on what "spot" on US soil that blood was first spilt.<ref>[http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=020/llcg020.db&recNum=102 Congressional Globe, 30th Session (1848) pp.93-95]</ref> In January of 1848, he was among the 82 Whigs who defeated 81 Democrats in a procedural vote to add to a routine bill the words "a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." The amendment passed, but the bill never reemerged from committee and was never finally voted upon.
Lincoln damaged his political reputation in Illinois with a speech in which he declared, "God of Heaven has forgotten to defend the weak and innocent, and permitted the strong band of murderers and demons from hell to kill men, women, and children, and lay waste and pillage the land of the just." Two weeks later, President Polk sent a peace treaty to Congress. While no one in Washington paid any attention to Lincoln, the Democrats orchestrated angry outbursts from across his district, where the war was popular and many men had volunteered. In one county, Democrats set up mass meetings that adopted resolutions denouncing the "treasonable assaults of guerrillas at home; party demagogues; slanderers of the President; defenders of the butchery at the Alamo; traducers of the heroism at San Jacinto."  Warned by his law partner that the political damage was mounting and irreparable, Lincoln decided not to run for reelection. Instead in fall 1848 he campaigned vigorously for Taylor, the successful general whose atrocities he had denounced in January. Regardless, Lincoln's harsh words were not soon forgotten, and haunted him during the [[American Civil War|Civil War]]. <ref> His attacks were also held against him when he applied for a patronage job in the new Taylor administration.  Albert J. Beveridge, . ''Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858'' (1928) 1: 428-33; David Donald, ''Lincoln'' (1995) pp. 140-43.  </ref>
==Peace==
==Peace==
==See also==
==See also==
Line 66: Line 77:


===Political and Diplomatic===
===Political and Diplomatic===
*  Beveridge, Albert J. ''Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858''. Volume: 1. 1928. [http://www.questia.com/library/book/abraham-lincoln-1809-1858-vol-1-by-albert-j-beveridge.jsp online edition]
* Gleijeses, Piero. "A Brush with Mexico" ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 223-254. Issn: 0145-2096;  debates in Washington before war. fulltext in [[EBSCO]]
* Gleijeses, Piero. "A Brush with Mexico" ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 223-254. Issn: 0145-2096;  debates in Washington before war. fulltext in [[EBSCO]]
* Graebner, Norman A. ''Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion''. (1955).
* Graebner, Norman A. ''Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion''. (1955).

Revision as of 04:27, 22 November 2007

The Mexican-American War (1846-48) was fought over control of Texas. Mexico lost all the battles and in the peace treaty gave up northern territories in exchange for $15 million.

Causes

Long-term causes

Perceptions of each side

Inside the U.S.

Along the border

Delay (2007) and Reséndez (2004) explain the American need to suppress Indian raids originating from Mexican territory. During the 1830s and 1840s, northern Mexico experienced a terrifying increase in interethnic violence as Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and other Indians attacked Mexican settlements across nine states in northern Mexico. Raids claimed thousands of lives, ruined the ranching and mining industries, and forced most Hispanics to flee the border region. Just as importantly, the violence shaped how Americans and Mexicans came to view each other in advance of the war. US observers saw Indians driving Mexicans backward, with the government there uninterested and incapable of defending the territory it had seized from Spain. With the Mexican army being used primarily to wage political battles for control of the government, Hispanic residents of the affected areas despaired that their government would help them; they increasingly welcomed American intervention, which they correctly expected would end the Indian raids. Mexican politicians compained Washington was fomenting Indian raids in order to acquire territory.

Meanwhile in New Mexico, the economy and society were becoming integated with the U.S. and nuevomexicanos were increasingly estranged from Mexico. Some Catholic priests tried to prevent full integration by restricting marriages between Protestant American men and Mexican Catholic women. By 1846 little fervor existed in New Mexico for resisting the American army. Consequently the Mexican army did not attempt to defend New Mexico or California. Few Hispanics after the war went to Mexico, as the great majority of tejanos, californios and nuevomexicanos preferred American rule..[1]

In Mexico

In Mexico itself Henderson (2007) emphasizes that Mexican agency in going to war reflected a profound sense of weakness. Mexico's revolutionary experience had produced a virulent factionalism based on divisions of race, class, region and ideology. The successful by Texas in 1836 only made it more clear that Mexico was too weak to populate, control and defend its northern territories, but that opinion was derided by Mexican politicians. Instead, they all denounced the policies of their rivals. The only common denominator was that Texas must be reconquered, even if that meant war with overwhelmingly superior U.S. military and economic power.

In any case Mexico was in no position to negotiate with the U.S. because of its instability. In 1846 alone the presidency changed hands 4 times, the war minister changed 6 times, the finance minister changed 16 times. [2] As one Mexican historian explains: [3]

"Mexican public opinion and all the various political factions that aspired to or that actually shared in power at that time, had to—willingly or unwillingly—participate in a very hawkish attitude toward the war. Anyone who tried to avoid open conflict with the United States was treated as a traitor. That was precisely the case of President José Joaquin de Herrera. At one time he, at least, seriously considered receiving the American special envoy, John Slidell, in order to negotiate the problem of Texas annexation peacefully. But as soon as he assumed that position, the president was accused of favoring the handing over of a part of national territory; he was accused of treason and was overthrown."

Mexico was not a democratic country. The Mexican people as a whole remained largely indifferent—otherwise Winfield Scott's landing at Vera Cruz and his decisive march on Mexico City would have been impossible. Mexico, unable to pursue a pragmatic strategy of negotiation and compromise, suffered—and celebrated—a "glorious defeat" that further unraveled a disunited nation.

Start of war

Shortly after the U.S. Congress by joint resolution annexed Texas in 1845, the Mexican government recalled its minister from Washington and broke off diplomatic relations. Government newspapers in Mexico City acted as if war already existed. On June 15, 1845, Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor, commanding American troops in the southwest, received orders to move forward into some disputed territory "on or near the Rio Grande." In August he encamped on the west bank of the Nueces River, Texas. President Polk then sent John Slidell of New Orleans to Mexico City with a proposal to adjust the boundary dispute, and to purchase Upper California and New Mexico. MExico rejected Slidell's mission, and rejected efforts by Britain to broker a compromise. It was time for war.


When the Mexican government refused to negotiate with Slidell, Polk on Jan. 3, 1846, instructed Taylor to advance. Within a month Taylor's forces were at the Rio Grande. On April 12 General Pedro Ampudia demanded that Taylor retreat beyond the Nueces. Taylor held his position, and on April 24 a Mexican force ambushed a party of American dragoons on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. Polk already had decided to recommend a declaration of war. On May 11 his message went to Congress. A war appropriation bill providing for enlistments passed both houses by overwhelming margins. Its preamble declared that the war existed by the act of Mexico.

Military operations 1846

Military operations 1847

General Winflield Scott launched an invasion, aimed at capturing Mexico City and forcing a negotiated peace.

Scott's invasion depleted the forces led by General Taylor, and in February 1847, near the small outpost of Buena Vista, he and his 4,500 regulars found themselves facing an army of more than 20,000 Mexican soldiers led by General Santa Anna. What might have been a rout ended up in a draw, with the American troops maneuvering quickly and regrouping in order to keep the surrounding Mexican troops from completely overrunning their position. Santa Anna was forced to withdraw, leaving Mexican forces demoralized, and politicians more willing to negotiate.

Battle of Buena Vista 1847
US army route to Mexico City 1847

U.S. Politics

Volunteer army

As regimental commanders, volunteer colonels were vital to American military efforts, raising units of volunteer soldiers who agreed to serve outside US boundaries. The came from western states, especially Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Of the 63 volunteer colonels on active duty in 1846, 14 belonged to the Whig Party, indicating that Whigs were not monolithic in their opposition to the war. The colonels accumulated a mixed wartime record of leadership, and their backgrounds varied greatly. Some had no military experience prior to 1846, but others had graduated from West Point, served in the regular army, seen combat in war or on the frontier, or held rank in a state militia. The colonels also varied widely in holding political office before and after the war. Several of them were experienced politicians before 1846 who also held important offices after the war, showing that most colonels were recognized figures in their home states.[4]

Antiwar sentiments

Politically, the Democratic party rallied behind Polk and strongly supported the war. The Whig Party has opposed the annexation of Texas and generally opposed the war. Some spponents (like Army lieutenany Ulysses S. Grant) believed the war constituted an unjust aggression against helpless Mexico. Henry Clay and many Whigs opposed geographical expansion because they wanted vertical modernization (based on industry and banking), rather than more-of-the-same farmland. Antislavery elements in New England saw the war as a conspiracy by soputhern slave owners--called the Slave Power--to expand their holdings. (Historians after 1900 agreed that allegation was untrue.) Still other dissenters feared the war might undercut republican values by transforming the United States from a republic to a grasping militaristic empire. Typical opponents used several different arguments, to no avail.

Abraham Lincoln a new member of Congress from Illinois, was not a particularly powerful or influential figure, but he was articulate in denouncing the war, which he attributed to Polk's desire for "military glory — that attractive rainbow, that rises in showers of blood." He also challenged the President's claims regarding the Texas boundary and offered a resoltuion (which did not pass) demanding to know on what "spot" on US soil that blood was first spilt.[5] In January of 1848, he was among the 82 Whigs who defeated 81 Democrats in a procedural vote to add to a routine bill the words "a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." The amendment passed, but the bill never reemerged from committee and was never finally voted upon.

Lincoln damaged his political reputation in Illinois with a speech in which he declared, "God of Heaven has forgotten to defend the weak and innocent, and permitted the strong band of murderers and demons from hell to kill men, women, and children, and lay waste and pillage the land of the just." Two weeks later, President Polk sent a peace treaty to Congress. While no one in Washington paid any attention to Lincoln, the Democrats orchestrated angry outbursts from across his district, where the war was popular and many men had volunteered. In one county, Democrats set up mass meetings that adopted resolutions denouncing the "treasonable assaults of guerrillas at home; party demagogues; slanderers of the President; defenders of the butchery at the Alamo; traducers of the heroism at San Jacinto." Warned by his law partner that the political damage was mounting and irreparable, Lincoln decided not to run for reelection. Instead in fall 1848 he campaigned vigorously for Taylor, the successful general whose atrocities he had denounced in January. Regardless, Lincoln's harsh words were not soon forgotten, and haunted him during the Civil War. [6]


Peace

See also

Bibliography

Surveys

  • Bancroft, H.H. History of Califroniaonline edition
  • Bauer K. Jack. The Mexican War, 1846-1848. Macmillan, 1974.
  • Crawford, Mark; Heidler, Jeanne T.; Heidler, David Stephen, eds. Encyclopedia of the Mexican War (1999) (ISBN 157607059X)
  • De Voto, Bernard, Year of Decision 1846 (1942), very well written popular history
  • Frazier, Donald S. ed. The U.S. and Mexico at War, (1998), 584; an encyclopedia with 600 articles by 200 scholars
  • Heidler, David S. and Heidler, Jeanne T. The Mexican War.Greenwood, 2005. 225 pp. basic survey, with some key primary sources
  • Meed, Douglas. The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (2003). 96pp by British scholar excerpt and text search
  • Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico 2 vol (1919); Pulitzer Prize; 2:233-52; online vol 1; online vol 2 Pulitzer Prize winner.

Military

  • Bauer, K. Jack. Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest. (1985).
  • Eisenhower, John. So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, (1989) excerpt and text search
  • Foos, Paul. A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican War (2002) excerpt and text search
  • Hamilton, Holman, Zachary Taylor: Soldier of the Republic , (1941)
  • Johnson, Timothy D. Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory (1998)
  • Lavender, David. Climax at Buena Vista: The Decisive Battle of the Mexican-American War (2003) excerpt and text search
  • Lewis, Lloyd. Captain Sam Grant (1950)
  • McCaffrey, James M. Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (1994)excerpt and text search
  • Winders, Richard Price. Mr. Polk's Army (1997) excerpt and text search

Political and Diplomatic

  • Gleijeses, Piero. "A Brush with Mexico" Diplomatic History 2005 29(2): 223-254. Issn: 0145-2096; debates in Washington before war. fulltext in EBSCO
  • Graebner, Norman A. Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion. (1955).
  • Graebner, Norman A. "Lessons of the Mexican War." Pacific Historical Review 47 (1978): 325-42. in JSTOR
  • Graebner, Norman A. "The Mexican War: A Study in Causation." Pacific Historical Review 49 (1980): 405-26. in JSTOR
  • Pletcher David M. The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War (1973).
  • Schroeder John H. Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848. 1973.
  • Sellers Charles G. James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843-1846 (1966), the standard biography
  • Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico 2 vol (1919); Pulitzer Prize; 2:233-52; online vol 1; online vol 2 Pulitzer Prize winner.
  • Weinberg Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History (1935). ACLS e-book

Hispanic perspectives

  • Brack, Gene M. Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846: An Essay on the Origins of the Mexican War (1975).
  • Delay, Brian. "Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War." American Historical Review 2007 112(1): 35-68. Issn: 0002-8762 Fulltext: History Cooperative
  • Fowler, Will. Santa Anna of Mexico (2007) 527pp; the major scholarly study
  • Fowler, Will. Tornel and Santa Anna: The Writer and the Caudillo, Mexico, 1795-1853 (2000)
  • Henderson, Timothy J. A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and Its War with the United States (2007), survey excerpt and text search
  • Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: Biography of Power, (1997)
  • Levinson, Irving W. Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, And The United States Of America, 1846-1848 (2005) except and text search
  • Mayers, David; Fernández Bravo, Sergio A., "La Guerra Con Mexico Y Los Disidentes Estadunidenses, 1846-1848" [The War with Mexico and US Dissenters, 1846-48]. Secuencia [Mexico] 2004 (59): 32-70. Issn: 0186-0348
  • Robinson, Cecil, The View From Chapultepec: Mexican Writers on the Mexican War, (1989)
  • Rodríguez Díaz, María Del Rosario. "Mexico's Vision of Manifest Destiny During the 1847 War" Journal of Popular Culture 2001 35(2): 41-50. Issn: 0022-3840
  • Reséndez, Andrés. Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (2004) excerpt and text search
  • Ruiz, Ramon Eduardo. Triumph and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People, (1992) ch 5 pp 205-19; excerpt and text search
  • Ruiz, Vicki L. "Nuestra America: Latino History as United States History." Journal of American History 2006 93(3): 655-672. Issn: 0021-8723 Fulltext: [History Cooperative]]
  • Yanez, Agustin. Santa Anna: Espectro de una sociedad (1996)

Primary Sources

  • Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant
  • Laidley, Theodore. Surrounded by Dangers of All Kinds: The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Theodore Laidley (1997) excerpt and text search
  • Polk, James. Polk: The Diary of a President, 1845-1849, Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest. edited by Allan Nevins (1929)

External links

  1. ↑ See Reséndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (2004)
  2. ↑ Donald Fithian Stevens, Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (1991) p. 11
  3. ↑ Miguel E. Soto, "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" in Essays on the Mexican War ed by Wayne Cutler; Texas A&M University Press. 1986. pp 66-67
  4. ↑ Joseph G. Dawson IIII, "Leaders for Manifest Destiny: American Volunteer Colonels Serving in the U.S.-Mexican War." American Nineteenth Century History (2006) 7(2): 253-279. Issn: 1466-4658 Fulltext: Ebsco
  5. ↑ Congressional Globe, 30th Session (1848) pp.93-95
  6. ↑ His attacks were also held against him when he applied for a patronage job in the new Taylor administration. Albert J. Beveridge, . Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858 (1928) 1: 428-33; David Donald, Lincoln (1995) pp. 140-43.
Retrieved from "https://citizendium.org/wiki/index.php?title=Mexican-American_War&oldid=344487"