User talk:George Swan/sandbox/Skirmish at Lejay, Afghanistan

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Clarifications and sourcing

In the first sentence, "Americans" does not link to any military organization. Presumably, for it to have an operation name, some military headquarters had to assign it, and this headquarters needs to be identified. Note that not all headquarters, in Afghanistan, with tactical control over U.S. units, are all-American. There are at least two major headquarters organizations in Afghanistan, the UN-mandated NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and apparently some U.S. special operations component that is subordinate to SOCCENT (Special Operations Component, United States Central Command, or possibly directly subordinated to U.S. Special Operations Command. I could not rule out that the responsible headquarters was an intermediate U.S. echelon in Afghanistan, reporting to ISAF or CENTCOM.

The nature of the code name suggests it was assigned, after the fact, by public affairs people at some upper-level headquarters. Real U.S. code names, used in planning operations, have very little meaning, although the first few letters indicate the organization and general program (e.g., RI programs are usually communications intelligence programs under Headquarters, USAF (e.g., RIVET JOINT), SE are imagery intelligence (SENIOR YEAR), while Central Command contingency plans, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, were PO (POLO STEP)).

A "public relations" code name of this type would be associated with a press release or briefing, probably at ISAF or CENTCOM. This should be available online.

"Skirmish", incidentally, is a military term of art describing a certain kind of ground invasion. Please cite the source of the term "Skirmish at Lejay".

In the first section, you cite "intelligence analysts" and "American forces". Please identify and, if possible, cite. There are very general terms like "air support" and "stopped all traffic". Who? How?

Again, generic "intelligence analysts" are mentioned in the second section; again, they should be identified.

At present, the article does not really seem to be about the actual skirmish, at least at any level of detail to let it be understood at a military level. The details concern the disposition of individuals who went to Guantanamo. If you can't detail the action, then I suggest renaming the article to something about challenged detentions of individuals taken into custody on the relevant dates, and not describe the action unless there is a credible level of detail. Howard C. Berkowitz 10:49, 29 June 2008 (CDT)

Skirmish, or alternatives

I picked the name skirmish. The allegations against the captives don't use the term "skirmish". I was unaware that this term had an official meaning. I picked it to reflect that this was not a "battle". Some of the allegations the captives faced described it as an "ambush". George Swan 16:19, 29 June 2008 (CDT)

Not trying to be critical, but, since it has a specific meaning, I didn't know if it had been used. You may have run across the term "skirmish line". A skirmish is usually considered to be a small engagement, with the additional characteristic that it results from two opposing formations, spread out in a ragged line, running into one another.

There's no rigorous definition of what makes something a "battle" -- a "campaign", arguably so. I'm reminded, however, of what an annoyed H Norman Schwarzkopf said at a press conference, when a reporter asked "how many mines make up a minefield?"

"One, if you're in it."

Seriously, the article seems to have a certain conflict between describing some type of military engagement, and a critique of the hearing process. For the record, I believe that the Guantanamo process is a travesty of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, with the caveat that the Geneva Conventions don't deal well with non-national combatants. Nevertheless, there is a flavor, in the writing, of trial argument. As a CZ military workgroup editor, I understand my responsibility is to help objectivity, rather than push my own opinions.

I do appreciate that you are bringing in fewer claims of the type of air support than in the forum. Nevertheless, I suspect you might have a stronger article if you stayed with the Guantanamo process, rather than trying to analyze an engagement for which there is very little actual data. I did search out some press accounts of the air attacks, and they variously contradict one another, as well as some of the aircraft capabilities. Some reports indicate that some of the airstrikes came from one or more Dutch F-16 aircraft, and, while I'm not certain, this may have been an ISAF operation in the field rather than unilaterally an American one. If so, that raises the question of why the U.S. got control of the individuals.

You may want to refer to some of the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm) as well as the U.S. legal decisions. Depending how far you are intending to analyze the proceedings, some discussion of the relevance of ex parte Quirin might be in order: http://law.jrank.org/pages/13645/Ex-Parte-Quirin.html

Howard C. Berkowitz 16:41, 29 June 2008 (CDT)

"Intelligence analysts"? "Administrative clerks"?

The table has a column listing page numbers. The large portable document format files I mentioned elsewhere contain mutliple documents. The column listing the page numbers directs readers to the page numbers within those .pdf files where each captives' memos, transcripts are found.

Who drafted the allegations? Who compiled the allegations? A reservist, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, published a pair of affidavits about how the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC) operated. Abraham is a lawyer in civilian life. Unlike many reservists who are lawyer in civilian life, he is not a lawyer in his military service. He is an intelligence officer. His affidavits are very critical of the lack of professionalism, and understanding of intelligence principles on the part of those drafting the allegation memos.

The authors of the OARDEC allegation memos based their memos on documents prepared by the CIA, the FBI, the "CITF" (ie Criminal Investigation Task Force), the Department of State, and the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA). The decision memos from the Administrative Review Boards always list the DASD-DA first, so it may have been the most important.

Is it fair to describe the authors of the source documents the OARDEC authors compiled their allegations from as "intelligence analysts"?

• CIA? Yes, no question, documents drafted by CIA officials can fairly be described as being the work of "intelligence analysts".
• FBI? Yes, no question, documents drafted by FBI officials can fairly be described as being the work of "intelligence analysts".
• State Department? The State Department has its own intelligence analysts, who did a lot better than military intelligence analysts in the lead-up to the Iraq war. Were memos drafted by the State Department drafted by the State Department's intelligence analysts? Not necessarily for the dozen Guantanamo captives who held prominent positions prior to 9-11. But, for the remaining 550 captives I suggest it is fair.
• DASD-DA? Who served within the DASD-DA? We don't know. I suggest that, like Richard Nixon's "plumbers", and the ad-hoc intelligence unit Douglas Feith set up, the staff in this office were politicized appointees, with an ideological axe to grind, serving as amateur intelligence analysts. Some of them may have had some kind of background in the established intelligence agencies, as Porter Goss had.

The OARDEC authors also, sometimes, relied on source documents from foreign intelligence agencies. I think it is fair to describe those documents as intelligence documents.

Did the OARDEC authors rely on intelligence flowing from the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) interrogations? It seems that in order to maintain plausible deniability that OARDEC and JTF-GTMO operated independently the OARDEC authors of the allegation memos prepared for the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (somtimes||generally||always) may not have tapped the JTF-GTMO intelligence files.

So, should the authors of the OARDEC allegation memos be described as "intelligence analysts"?

The OARDEC proceeding were "administrative proceedings", not "legal proceedings". This was the justification for not allowing the captives access to legal advice. I guess one could argue that, based on Stephen Abraham's assessment that they lacked the proper training to operate as intelligence analysts, the author could be described as "administrators", or "administrative clerks". But, without regard to the competence or training of an individual, I would suggest it is reasonable to describe the authors who collated and compiled summaries based on intelligence reports should be described as "intelligence analysts", because that is the function they held, without regard to their competence or their (unknown) job titles.

Cheers! George Swan 17:46, 29 June 2008 (CDT)

Are you familiar with Feith's Office of Special Plans, which, by most accounts, was a group set up from Cheney's office to take raw intelligence reports, select the ones that supported a particular position, edit them, and send them up the food chain along with things that had gone through the process, perfect or not, of the National Intelligence Council? Would you call the OSP staff "intelligence analysts"?

Ever run across people like George Harvey or James Jesus Angleton? CIA employees, certainly. Intelligence analysts?

The State Department has its own intelligence analysts, who did a lot better than military intelligence analysts in the lead-up to the Iraq war.

I assume you refer to INR. Which specific military intelligence analysts are they better than? CENTCOM J-2? DIA? If the latter, Defense HUMINT, the MASINT people, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, National Ground Intelligence Center, JCS Support, or what?

Now, Sam Adams, author of War of Numbers, was, by any reasonable definition, an intelligence analyst. He resigned from CIA, with his book being published posthumously after he died young of a heart attack. He resigned, in fairly civil protest, over what he considered to be the manipulation, in the Johnson Administration, of the published CIA estimates of casualties in Vietnam. They were adjusted to reduce infighting among J-2 MACV, DIA, and the White House. As it was, even the adjusted CIA estimates were closer to the facts than the others. See another perspective in H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty. Incidentally, is McMaster, who I'm happy to say finally is getting his general's star, an intelligence analyst? The book was derived from his doctoral dissertation, and he has a significant amount of strategic evaluation and planning experience when not commanding combat units. IMHO, it was a scandal that he was twice passed over for brigadier general, mostly for both excelling in the Army and shaking it up.

I guess one could argue that, based on Stephen Abraham's assessment that they lacked the proper training to operate as intelligence analysts, the author could be described as "administrators", or "administrative clerks". But, without regard to the competence or training of an individual, I would suggest it is reasonable to describe the authors who collated and compiled summaries based on intelligence reports should be described as "intelligence analysts", because that is the function they held, without regard to their competence or their (unknown) job titles.

Regretfully, I would have to say that your "I guess" is an accurate characterization. You don't know. I don't know. I fully agree that the Administration has not made it easy to find truth, but guessing is not appropriate in an encyclopedia article. You also say (my emphasis)

It seems that in order to maintain plausible deniability that OARDEC and JTF-GTMO operated independently the OARDEC authors of the allegation memos prepared for the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (somtimes||generally||always) may not have tapped the JTF-GTMO intelligence files.

And what is the source, or the chain of evidence, that establishes that someone in the chain of command ordered that plausible deniability was needed? Sorry, I'm finding your article to be argumentative rather than objective, whether or not there have been violations in the proceedings. It's one thing to establish violations with a series of quotes from court opinions, but I'm hearing mostly your opinion, which, regretfully, comes across as angry.

Please revise to what you can actually establish, not guess. Howard C. Berkowitz 19:48, 29 June 2008 (CDT)

Doug Feith's crew, and James Jesus Angleton?

Yes. I am familiar with Feith. Yes, prior to our dialogue here, I would have had not reservation calling those in his special unit "intelligence analysts". One can speculate about their training, or lack thereof; one can speculate about their intellectual honesty, or lack thereof; one can speculate about their competence, or lack thereof. But the job they were performing -- of failing to perform -- was an intelligence analysis.

Let me know if this is confusing, and I'll make my comments at the end, but it may be easier to follow this inline -- no problem if you don't like the technique. No, I wouldn't call Feith's group intelligence analysts. I'd call them political operatives.

In my own training in intelligence analysis, a constant refrain, obviously not honored much of the time and sometimes not even wanted, my instructors hammered that the job of an analyst was providing information to policymakers, rather than making policy. If you look at intelligence dissemination management#net analysis, you'll see a controlled way where policy and analysis can mix. It is never professional intelligence analysis to start with a conclusion and then look for facts, or suggestions, to support it. That is what OSP did deliberately.

Sometimes an analyst unconsciously gets biased, and there's an extensive literature in analytic tradecraft for avoiding that. See cognitive traps for intelligence analysis.

I have never heard of George Harvey. But I have come across James Jesus Angleton.

Harvey, to put it mildly, was a drunken wild man, in covert operations. He was active in a number of the operations against Cuba, including some of the less well known assassination attempts against Castro that came a good deal closer than exploding cigars. My point is that while he was a senior employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, he was a covert action specialist; working for the CIA doesn't mean you do intelligence, in the analytic sense.

I'll mention, for other readers unfamiliar with Angleton, that he spent several decades being in charge of the CIA Department in charge of searching for moles within the CIA.

He was the Chief of Counterintelligence Staff, a job that calls for a certain degree of paranoia, but few would call his suspicions analytic. Rather, they were barely controlled paranoia that, at times, nearly paralyzed the CIA.

Could Angleton be described as an "intelligence analyst"? When he went to meetings to discuss moles, or other intelligence topics, or when he wrote or reviewed intelligence reports, prior to this dialogue, I would have had no hesitation asserting he was.

You see, we have a disagreement. At best, he was a manager of analysts. Unfortunately, he was charismatic and also had CIA people worried on what he might do to them. Firing him was one of the wisest things, IMNSHO, that a Director of Central Intelligence ever did. Oh--he failed to catch the real spies.

Returning to the article, I did write that the State Department's intelligence analysts did a better job in the lead-up to the Iraq war. I did read a convincing account of this. But, it doesn't really have anything to do with the article. So I am going to skip trying to defend it.

I have no ego attachment to calling the incident a "skirmish". I have no ego attachment to calling the American officials who analyzed and/or compiled the allegations against these nine men "intelligence analysts".

Now, regarding the concerns with the article you have been specific about...

• You are concerned over my use of the phrase "intelligence analysts";
• You think the air strike needs more documentation;

Am I missing something?

Apropos of the air strike, I think you are trying to make one article do two different things that don't work in a single article. A tactical analysis of combat is a self-contained subject. A legal and even intelligence analysis of the capture and dispositions of prisoners is a separate topic with separate issues. I'd suggest you take out everything more than a sentence or two about combat, rename the article to something like "U.S. handling of prisoners from Lejay, Afghanistan", and focus on that. You have more information available on that, and, if I may dare to suggest, you have more of a sense of when to use habeas corpus than when to use a Mark 82 versus Mark 84 bomb, and when an F-16 is appropriate and a B-52 is not -- or vice vesa.

As far as intelligence analysis, so far, I haven't seen any in the article. I've seen partisan legal arguments on both sides, and a good deal of political indignation. Talleyrand's advice to young French diplomats, "above all, no zeal" applies to what should be careful intelligence analysis. Incidentally, there is a distinction among raw intelligence, processed intelligence reporting, and intelligence estimates, and it's important if you are going to get into intelligence.

If an intelligence analyst is making allegations in a quasi-judicial proceeding, he's no longer doing intelligence analysis. He's doing law, politics, or psychological operations. Howard C. Berkowitz 23:32, 29 June 2008 (CDT)