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In [[philosophy]] the field of '''ontology''' considers what things exist, and what existence implies.<ref name=Lawson/> | In [[philosophy]] the field of '''ontology''' considers what things exist, and what existence implies.<ref name=Lawson/> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/ Quine] has called the question ‘What is there?’ "the ontological question".<ref name=Quine1/> | ||
For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | ||
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'reasonable' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, regardless of whether they are true, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> Another large arena for discussion is the existence of ''properties'' and other ''universals'' that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one,<ref name=Swoyer/> and their distinction from instances (tropes).<ref name=Bacon/> | For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'reasonable' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, regardless of whether they are true, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> Another large arena for discussion is the existence of ''properties'' and other [[Universals|''universals'']] that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one,<ref name=Swoyer/> and their distinction from instances (tropes).<ref name=Bacon/> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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<ref name=Bacon> | <ref name=Bacon> | ||
{{cite web |author=Bacon, John |title=Tropes |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/tropes/ |date=Feb 27, 2008}} | {{cite web |author=Bacon, John |title= Tropes |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed. |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/tropes/ |date=Feb 27, 2008}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
<ref name=Hirsch> | <ref name=Hirsch> | ||
{{cite book |title=Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology |author=Eli Hirsch |url=http://books.google.ca/books?id=iPRqtcjeHPsC&pg=PR12&lpg=PR12 |chapter=Introduction |pages=p. ''xii'' |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=0199732116}} | {{cite book |title=Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology |author=Eli Hirsch |url=http://books.google.ca/books?id=iPRqtcjeHPsC&pg=PR12&lpg=PR12 |chapter=Introduction |pages=p. ''xii'' |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=0199732116}} | ||
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<ref name=Putnam> | <ref name=Putnam> | ||
{{cite book |author= Hilary Putnam |year= 1987 |pages=p. 33 |title=The Many Faces of Realism |publisher=Open Court |url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=TCG-Ua27FoLPywHngoHwBw&id=32ENAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22The+Many+Faces+of+Realism+%22&q=%22another+way+of+insisting+that+mereological+sums+really+exist+%22#search_anchor |edition=2nd |isbn=0812690427 |edition=2nd}} | {{cite book |author= Hilary Putnam |year= 1987 |pages=p. 33 |title=The Many Faces of Realism |publisher=Open Court |url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=TCG-Ua27FoLPywHngoHwBw&id=32ENAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22The+Many+Faces+of+Realism+%22&q=%22another+way+of+insisting+that+mereological+sums+really+exist+%22#search_anchor |edition=2nd |isbn=0812690427 |edition=2nd}} | ||
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<ref name=Quine1> | |||
{{cite journal |author=Willard van Orman Quine |title=On what there is |url=http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20123117?uid=3739824&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102435344371 |journal=Review of metaphysics |volume=2 |number=5 |date=September, 1948 |pages=p. 21 ''ff''}} Reprinted in {{cite book |title=From a logical point of view| author=Willard van Orman Quine |publisher=Harvard University Press |date=1980 |chapter=Chapter 1: On what there is |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC&printsec=frontcover |isbn= 0674323513 |edition=2nd}} On-line version is found [http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/philosophische_fakultaet/iph/thph/braeuer/lehre/metameta/Quine%20-%20On%20What%20There%20Is.pdf here]. | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
<ref name=Swoyer> | <ref name=Swoyer> | ||
{{cite web |date=September 12, 2011 |author=Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco |title= Properties |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta, ed. | {{cite web |date=September 12, 2011 |author=Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco |title=  Properties |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta, ed.|url= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/properties/}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
<ref name=Westerstahl> | <ref name=Westerstahl> | ||
{{cite web |author= Dag Westerståhl |title=Generalized Quantifiers |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed. | {{cite web |author= Dag Westerståhl |title= Generalized Quantifiers |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed. |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/generalized-quantifiers/ |date=April 19, 2011 }} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
}} | }}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]] | ||
Latest revision as of 17:00, 28 September 2024
In philosophy the field of ontology considers what things exist, and what existence implies.[1] Quine has called the question ‘What is there?’ "the ontological question".[2]
For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the usage of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.[3] Such phrases are called quantifier expressions.[4]
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of mereology. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'reasonable' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?[5] Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, regardless of whether they are true, are about something?[6] Another large arena for discussion is the existence of properties and other universals that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one,[7] and their distinction from instances (tropes).[8]
References
- ↑ Tony Lawson (December, 2004). A concept of ontology. Retrieved on 2013-07-19.
- ↑ Willard van Orman Quine (September, 1948). "On what there is". Review of metaphysics 2: p. 21 ff. Reprinted in Willard van Orman Quine (1980). “Chapter 1: On what there is”, From a logical point of view, 2nd. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674323513. On-line version is found here.
- ↑ Eli Hirsch (2011). “Introduction”, Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University Press, p. xii. ISBN 0199732116.
- ↑ Dag Westerståhl (April 19, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed.: Generalized Quantifiers. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition).
- ↑ Hilary Putnam (1987). The Many Faces of Realism, 2nd. Open Court, p. 33. ISBN 0812690427.
- ↑ Alex Orenstein, Petr Kotatko (2001). “Plato's beard and Quine's stubble”, Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Springer, p. 210. ISBN 140200253X.
- ↑ Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco (September 12, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed.: Properties. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).
- ↑ Bacon, John (Feb 27, 2008). Edward N. Zalta, ed.: Tropes. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).