Arthur Schopenhauer

(PD) Painting: Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl
Schopenhauer in 1815, painting by Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl

Arthur Schopenhauer (born in Danzig, February 22, 1788–died in Frankfurt am Main, September 1, 1860) was a German philosopher whose philosophy was influenced by Plato, Immanuel Kant and the teachings of the Upanishads. He had an outspoken pessimistic view of life, because life for him equalled willing and willing resulted in suffering. The main themes of his philosophical thought are present in his major work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ('The World as Will and Representation', or 'The World as Will and Idea'), published in 1819.

Early life and study

In his childhood he travelled extensively and went to Germany, France and England. His mother was a novelist and through her Arthur became acquainted with Goethe, Schlegel and the Brothers Grimm. He briefly studied medicine at the University of Göttingen and went to Berlin to study philosophy. In 1813 he received a doctorate in Jena for his dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in which he laid the groundwork for his later philosophy.

Philosophy

Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation

Schopenhauer begins this text with the line "The world is my representation". Insofar as what we know of the outer world is not by means of direct experience, it represents our idea of the world as such can be cognized by way of a perceiving consciousness. Although at first glance it would appear possible, Schopenhauer's Ideas are not to be confused with Plato's Ideas. (Janaway sees Schopenhauer's Ideas "as a compromise between the quasi-Platonic notion of a 'better consciousness', the Kantian epistemological framework, and the doctrines of the primacy of the will.")

Plato makes a distinction between the phenomenal world and the true world of ideas. Likewise, Schopenhauer makes a distinction. However, to understand the ways in which he is Platonic and the ways he is not requires a brief background in Schopenhauer' engagement with Kant's view of the thing-in-itself, a view that informs and directs the place Schopenhauer accords to Plato's Forms.

Kant is a dualist insofar as he separates the world of the senses and the world of things-in-themselves. For Kant, things-in-themselves must remain unknown to us because of the restrictions of our cognition. In a sense the strict separation of noumenal and phenomenal makes for the very restriction. For Kant, noumena include the soul, God, and other 'things-in-themselves' intuited by the intellect alone but these 'things' are beyond experience and to be opposed to phenomenonal representations, that is, objects of cognition capable of being perceived by the senses. For Kant, because we are only ever able to 'experience' phenomena, the noumenal world represents a world of 'things' beyond experience and, therefore, beyond the practical limits of our reason. It is in 'determinate' experience that we are able to judge and categorize the world of phenomena. We can see, following a scientific model of causality, that events in the physical world submit to rules of causality. However, the noumenal world is not determinable in the same way.

There is a further and necessary distinction that must be made if it is not clear already from the previous suggestion, that is, that Kant allows for a plurality of things-in-themselves whereas Schopenhauer does not. For Schopenhauer, the world of experience is - in a drastic way given the absence of causality whatsoever in the thing-in-itself - a phenomenon of an undivided thing-in-itself (the Will).

As made plain in his dissertation The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the two-world model of reality of Plato, Leibniz, and, to a lesser degree, Kant, misunderstands the function of causality when it admits to supersensible causation. For Schopenhauer, causality, as the form of time, is an a priori principle that governs the world of phenomenon. However, it is a principle that does not apply to the thing-in-itself. Havoc would ensue if a transcendent causality supervened on the phenomenal world, a difficulty taken up by Kant in the CPR's treatment of the antinomies and in which he upholds the power of the subject to supervene upon appearances. Kant is well aware of the problem of freedom that ensues in the phenomenal model, that is, the determinism arising when all things are subjected to a thoroughgoing causality. In a way that Schopenhauer does not, Kant leaves open a gap, a possibility of supersensible causes beyond the phenomenal sphere and, therefore, a space for the subject in its freedom.

To the contrary, Schopenhauer's 'I' is empirical, having no transcendental or noumenal counterpart as in Kant. The rejection of a transcendental 'I' with causative power over phenomena puts in question the possibility of moral imperatives and of a subject of freedom. A consequence of Schopenhauer's view is that the "incursion [by thing-in-itself] into the phenomenal world must be uncaused," and the principium individuationis limited to time and space, which do "not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only the forms of our knowing." Further, it is unclear how, or in what way, an empirical 'I' can be said to be truly causative. Cognition, as is the case in Kant, is placed on the side of determinate experience. Causality, too, is limited to experience, a thesis, continued from The Fourfold Root, that while Schopenhauer thinks otherwise, seems to go beyond Kant's step back to a more modest view of causality as a regulative principle.

Now it is possible to show why what Schopenhauer calls 'the world as representation' is of course the exact opposite of what Plato meant by Idea in hisTheory of Forms. From the previous, we can see that the species of causes Schopenhauer rejects are the only types Plato admits. To be certain, Schopenhauer's world as idea is the world as we experience it at its most ethereal point, e.g., in the experience of art or the sublime. However, the idea remains always in the immanent world of phenomenon even if it appears to hover at the very edge, at a point where it might touch the thing-in-itself. The ideas, for Schopenhauer, are not the immutable Forms beyond the reach of causality of Plato's Philosophy, that is, the true real 'things' in which the sensible world participates. The Schopenhauerian ideas are the form in which cognition to have quieted the Will objectification of itself in phenomenon. This is ironic given Schopenhauer's privileging of perception over concepts.

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