European ballistic missile defense

Ballistic missile defense, in the post-Cold War era, is increasingly an issue for Europe. The primary concern is no longer the Soviet Union, but Iran and possibly other Middle Eastern actors. While Russia theoretically is a threat, it is not a likely one.

Russsia, however, became indignant over what it saw as U.S. action in its sphere of influence, when the George W. Bush Administration proposed placing Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptors in Poland. While much mass media coverage portrayed this as a shield against attacks against Eastern Europe, the particular technology proposed actually was optimized for protecting the East coast of the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

On 17 September 2009, the Obama administration withdrew the earlier proposal, in part because it could not be implemented for several years, and really did not address the short-term Iranian threat of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. An alternative approach can be deployed in a year, at lower cost. It has been proposed that the system be implemented as a European multilateral defense, rather than bilateral agreements with the U.S.

Review of threats

Type	Range	Examples
medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)	800-2,399 km 500-1499 mi	Iranian Shahab 3, Israeli Jericho II
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)	1,400-5,499 km 1,500-3,437 mi	Israeli Jericho III, North Korean Nodong B; Iranian Shahab 3B derivative Chinese DF-4
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)	+ 5,500 km + 3,438 mi	Chinese DF-5, North Korean Taepo Dong 2, Russian RT-2 and RSM-52§, U.S. LGM-30 Minuteman and UGM-133 Trident D5§

§submarine launched

Point of launch	Point of impact	Range
Teheran	Warsaw	3020 kilometers 1876 miles
	London	4408 kilometers 2739 miles
	Washington, DC	10,201 kilometers 6339 miles

Initial proposals

In this illustration from the Congressional Budget Office, the systems shown are principally European-based components for engaging ICBMs aimed at the United States. The initial Bush administration proposal was silo-based GBI, option 1, which is midcourse-intercept-only and could not provide terminal defense of a target in Europe, except possibly in a very limited engagement geometry This proposal also assumed ten interceptor missiles, with two fired at each incoming ICBM, so six Iranian missiles could saturate the system even under fairly optimal assumptions.

Current warships that fire SM-3 have between 96 and 120 launch tubes, although all might not be filled with SM-3's; it would be prudent to give the ship some SM-2 and ESSM anti-aircraft missiles for self-defense. These could engage incoming IRBMs.

Option 3 assumes the SM-3 missiles are on land, which is not a major technological effort, but also includes a not-yet-operational KEI.