Guerrilla warfare: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
||
Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
The U.S. military doctrine for operating as a guerilla is [[unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)]], while the doctrine for counterguerilla operations is [[Foreign Internal Defense]]. | The U.S. military doctrine for operating as a guerilla is [[unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)]], while the doctrine for counterguerilla operations is [[Foreign Internal Defense]]. | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} |
Revision as of 17:48, 13 September 2009
Guerilla warfare is a set of strategic, operational, and tactical actions, within a political context, taken against an enemy in territory dominated by that enemy. Enemy forces are expected to be stronger than the guerrilla force, either because the area of operations is the enemy's home area, or an area that he occupies.
Since the enemy is stronger, the guerilla force must fight only on terms favorable to the guerilla; guerilla warfare, although centuries old, is, in modern terms, asymmetrical warfare. In its ever-present political dimension, it is a form of insurgency.
"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." — Mao Zedong[1]
Guerillas frequently do not wear uniform and hide among sympathetic civilians, so they are often in violation of the Third Geneva Convention. They claim military necessity for this approach, as they would be annihilated in conventional combat.
The U.S. military doctrine for operating as a guerilla is unconventional warfare (United States doctrine), while the doctrine for counterguerilla operations is Foreign Internal Defense.
References
- ↑ Mao, Tse-tung (1967), Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I, Foreign Languages Press, at 179-254